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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
CIVIL RIGHTS - JUDICIAL IMMUNITY - PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
HELD TO BE IMMUNE FROM SUIT BROUGHT UNDER THE CIVIL RIGHTS
ACT OF 1871.
Bauers v. Heisel (3d Cir. 1966)
Plaintiff was tried and convicted for automobile larceny and prison
escape while a juvenile because of an erroneous determination made by
defendant, the Hunterdon County prosecutor, that he was an adult. Follow-
ing the completion of his sentence, plaintiff successfully applied for the
vacation of his conviction' and instituted a civil suit for damages under
the Civil Rights Act,2 alleging that he had been deprived of his liberty and
his right to a speedy trial. The United States District Court for New
Jersey dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit affirmed, holding that the common law doctrine of judicial
immunity was not abrogated by 42 U.S.C. 1983 and that a prosecuting
attorney has the same immunity afforded members of the judiciary. Bauers
v. Heisel, 361 F.2d 581 (3d Cir. 1966).3
The Civil Rights Act of 1871, re-enacted in 1952, was one of the
statutes and constitutional amendments 4 that came into being as a result of
the Civil War and the subsequent era of increased concern for civil liberties.5
It was designed to provide relief for persons subjected to "misuse of power,
possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrong-
doer is clothed with the authority of state law. . .. "I'
Section 1983 has engendered considerable debate concerning its effect
on the common law doctrine of judicial immunity. This doctrine, which
1. In vacating the sentences, the court held that since plaintiff was not eighteen
years old when the offenses were committed, jurisdiction was vested in the Juvenile
and Domestic Relations Court and no criminal process could be invoked against ajuvenile without a reference of the case to the county prosecutor by the juvenile court.
N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A: 4-14-15 (Supp. 1965). State v. Bauers, No. A-510-63, May 8,
1964 (unreported).
2. SEcTiON 1983 CIVIL AcTIoN vOR DEPRIVATION or RirHTS.
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress.
Rv. STAT. § 1979 (1875), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1952) (formerly Civil Rights Act of
April 20, 1871, Ch. 22 § 1, 17 Stat. 13).
3. Overruling Picking v. Pennsylvania R.R., 151 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1945).
4. E.g., U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIII; Riv. STAT. § 1980 (1875), 42 U.S.C. § 1985
(1952).
5. Comment, 36 IND. L.J. 317, 318 (1961).
6. United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941), quoted in Monroe v. Pape,
365 U.S. 167, 184 (1961).
(171)
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exempts judges from liability "for acts done by them in the exercise of
their judicial function,"'7 would seem to be unavailing under a literal
reading of the statutes since it imposes liability on "every person" who
effects the deprivation of another's civil rights.
Reference to debates in the enacting Congress sheds little light on
congressional intent to abolish or leave the immunity intact since only those
opposed to the enactment of the bill referred to its effect on judicial
immunity.9 Their charges which indicate that they feared that judicial
immunity would be no defense to an action under the bill,10 were not an-
swered during the debates by the proponents of the bill. The court in the
present case attributed this failure to respond to the lengthy duration of
the debates and the liklihood that the proponents were not present at the
sessions during which the charges were made, thus refusing to infer agree-
ment from silence." Although the court's historical analysis showing the
lack of clear congressional intent is persuasive, there are other factors sup-
porting a different conclusion. Representative Shellabarge, who introduced
the bill, and other proponents discussed and explained every other major
criticism 12 and consistently corrected errors and misunderstandings.'8 A
reasonable explanation for their failure to respond to the comments con-
cerning judicial immunity would be that a response would have required
an admission that immunity would be abrogated by the bill. 14 Such an
admission would have solidified the opposition. Thus, the legislative his-
tory of the bill could be used to support the thesis that judicial immunity
is no defense to a suit brought under the act.
The Civil Rights Act of 1871 was seldom used as a basis for relief
until the last quarter century. 15 Its recent revival has generated many
arguments against a literal reading of the statute.' 6 Such arguments have
7. Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 347 (1871). Coke held that "judges
of the realm could not be drawn in question for any supposed corruption impeaching
the verity of their records, except before the King himself. . . ." Id. at 347-48.
8. Ginsberg v. Stern, 125 F. Supp. 596, 601 (W.D. Pa.), aff'd, 225 F.2d 245(3d Cir. 1954) ; Dunn v. Estes, 117 F. Supp. 146, 148 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'd sub. nora.
Dunn v. Gazzola, 216 F.2d 709 (1st Cir. 1954).
9. See Note, 66 HARV. L. Rev. 1285, 1296 n.56 (1953).
10. Congressman Arthur of Kentucky stated:
Hitherto, . . .no judge or court has been held liable, civilly or criminally, forjudicial acts and the ministerial agents of the law have been covered by the same
aegis of exemption .... Under the provisions of this section every judge in the
State court and every officer thereof . . .will enter upon and pursue the call of
official duty with the sword of Damocles suspended over him. ...
Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., 365-66 (1871).
Congressman Lewis of Kentucky stated:
By the first section, in certain cases, the judge of a State court, though acting
under oath of office, is made liable to a suit in a Federal court and subject to
damages for his decision against a suitor, however honest and conscientious that
decision may be. ...
Id. at 385.
11. Bauers v. Heisel, 361 F.2d 581, 587-88 n.8 (3d Cir. 1966).
12. Comment, 12 How. L.J. 285, 296 n.93 (1966).
13. Note, 66 HARV. L. Rzv. 1285, 1296 n.56 (1953).
14. Ibid; Comment, 12 How. L.J. 285, 296 n.93 (1966).
15. See Comment, 36 IND. L.J. 317, 319 (1961).
16. The arguments include: (1) The danger of influencing officials by the threat
of a law suit; (2) The deterrent effect on men who are entering public life; (3) The
[VOL. 12
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been favorably received by the courts and common law legislative and
judicial immunity have generally been recognized as a defense to suits
under the act. In Tenney v. Brandhove,17 the United States Supreme
Court held that legislative immunity was a valid defense to a suit brought
under the act. In so holding, the Court stated: "We cannot believe that
Congress .. .would impinge on a tradition so well grounded in history
and reason by covert inclusion in the general language before us."',,
Judicial immunity from suits under the Civil Rights Act had been
upheld, for the most part, even prior to the Tenney decision.' 9 Although
it can be argued that Tenney does not require judicial immunity, 20 the
courts have used it to support an apparent predisposition toward immunity
by reasoning that judicial immunity has a stronger foundation in tradi-
tion than does legislative immunity.21 The presence of the holding in
Tenney has merely made lower courts more willing to expressly base their
drain on the time of officials caused by insubstantial law suits; (4) The unfairness of
subjecting officials to liability for the acts of subordinates; (5) The theory that the
official owes a duty to the public and not to the individual; (6) The feeling that the
ballot and formal removal proceedings are more appropriate ways to enforce the
honesty and efficiency of public officers. Robichaud v. Ronan, 351 F.2d 533, 535-36
(9th Cir. 1965) ; Note, 66 HARV. L. Rgv. 1285, 1295 n.54 (1953) ; (7) The respect for
state autonomy. Note, 68 HARv. L. Rxv. 1229, 1232 (1955) ; (8) All officials are sub-
ject to the equity provision of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Comment, 40 NOTRE DAMt LAW. 70,
77 (1964); E.g., McNeese v. Board of Education, 373 U.S. 668 (1963); Sterling v.
Constantin, 287 U.S. 378 (1932). However, equity relief is often inadequate since the
injury has already been done. Comment, 36 IND. L.J. 317, 337 (1961). Arguments
especially pertinent to judicial immunity include: (9) The judge would be required
to expose himself to liability after he has attempted, in part at the party's request, to
render a fair judgment. Comment, 39 N.Y.U.L. Rnv. 839, 853-54 (1964) ; (10) The
judicial system controls the judge and protects the litigant through appeal and habeas
corpus. Note, 68 HARV. L. Rlv., supra at 1237; Note, 66 HARV. L. REv., supra at 1297;
(11) The danger of favoritism to those attorneys who defend the judges. Ginsberg v.
Stern, 125 F. Supp. 596, 602 (W.D. Pa.), aff'd, 225 F.2d 245 (3d Cir. 1954) ; (12) The
judge would have to preserve a complete record of all evidence produced before him
in every litigated case. Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 349 (1871), quoted
in Francis v. Crafts, 203 F.2d 809, 812 (1st Cir. 1953) ; (13) The need at some point
of absolute finality in the litigation of controversies along with the practical difficulties
and lack of adequate criteria in subjecting judicial determinations to such a form of
collateral attack. Jennings, Tort Liability of Administrative Officers, 21 MINN. L.
Rtv. 263, 271-72 (1937).
17. 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
18. Id. at 376.
19. There appears to have been only four cases holding a judge liable for damages
up to the time that Tenney was handed down. These cases are: Ex parte Virginia,
100 U.S. 339 (1880) (liability for selection of jury; ministerial function) ; Cooper v.
Hutchinson, 184 F.2d 119 (3d Cir. 1950) ; McShane v. Moldovan, 172 F.2d 1016 (6th
Cir. 1949) (this case did not consider judicial immunity being decided on the basis of
the phrase "color of law" in the statute). Kenney v. Fox, 232 F.2d 288, 293 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied sub nom., Kenney v. Killian, 352 U.S. 855 (1956) ; Picking v. Pennsyl-
vania R.R., 151 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1945).
20. As Mr. Justice Douglas stated in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961) : "It
was not the unavailability of state remedies but the failure of certain States to enforce
the laws with an equal hand that furnished the powerful momentum behind this 'force
bill'." Id. at 174-75. "There was, it was said, no quarrel with the state laws on the
books. It was their lack of enforcement that was the nub of the difficulty." Id. at 176.
Thus, Congress was largely concerned with law enforcement. An intent to retain
legislative immunity and to abrogate judicial and executive immunity would be con-
sistent with this attitude.
21. See Morgan v. Sylvester, 125 F. Supp. 380, 385 (S.D.N.Y. 1954), aff'd, 220
F.2d 758 (2d Cir. 1955).
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decisions on immunity.22 The present case now means that each of the fed-
eral circuit courts that has considered the question recognizes the defense, 23
subject to the one generally recognized limitation which holds judicial
officers liable for acts performed in the complete absence of jurisdiction. 24
The Third Circuit, as well as most other circuits, has extended im-
munity to "quasi-judicial" officers, in this case a prosecuting attorney. The
term "quasi-judicial" is applied to officers who participate in the judicial
process and whose duties demand the exercise of judgment and discretion.2 5
The earliest case upholding this grant of immunity was Yaselli v. Goff26
which held that a prosecuting attorney was immune from suit even when
malice was alleged. 27 Although the extension has been less rapid in this
area,28 the prosecuting attorney has enjoyed an expanding shield of protec-
tion since the Yaselli decision and especially after the Tenney decision. 29
It seems that there have been only three cases in which a cause of action
under the Civil Rights Act against a prosecuting attorney has been recog-
nized30 and in only two was it decisive of the case.3' Nevertheless, the scope
of the prosecuting attorney's immunity is largely undefined.32 Many courts
22. Comment, 18 ARK. L. Rxv. 81, 86 (1964), e.g., Johnson v. MacCoy, 278 F.2d
37 (9th Cir. 1960) ; Tate v. Arnold, 223 F.2d 782 (8th Cir. 1955) ; Francis v. Crafts,
203 F.2d 809, 812 (1st Cir. 1953) ; Ginsberg v. Stern, 125 F. Supp. 596, 602 (W.D.
Pa.), aft'd, 225 F. 2d 245 (3d Cir. 1954) ; Morgan v. Sylvester, supra note 21.
23. E.g., Francis v. Crafts, supra note 22; Scolnick v. Lefkowitz, 329 F.2d 716(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 825 (1964) ; Bauers v. Heisel, 361 F.2d 581 (3d Cir.
1966) ; Souther v. Reid, 101 F. Supp. 806 (E.D. Va. 1951) (the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has not considered the question) ; Gay v. Heller,
252 F.2d 313 (5th Cir. 1958) ; Hurlburt v. Graham, 323 F.2d 723 (6th Cir. 1963) ;
Stift v. Lynch, 267 F.2d 237 (7th Cir. 1959) ; Tate v. Arnold, supra note 22; Holmes v.
Henderson, 249 F.2d 529 (9th Cir. 1957) ; Gately v. Sutton, 310 F.2d 107 (10th Cir.
1962) ; Laughlin v. Rosenman, 163 F.2d 838 (D.C. Cir. 1947).
24. E.g., Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 351-52 (1871) ; Stift v.
Lynch, supra note 23; Francis v. Lyman, 216 F.2d 583 (1st Cir. 1954).
A distinction must be here observed between excess of jurisdiction and the
clear absence of all jurisdiction over the subject-matter. Where there is clearly
no jurisdiction over the subject-matter, any authority exercised is a usurped
authority, and for the exercise of such authority, when the want of jurisdiction
is known to the judge, no excuse is permissible.
Bradley v. Fisher, supra at 351-52 quoted in Bauers v. Heisel, supra note 23, at 590.
25. Many courts appear to use the term "quasi-judicial" in a broad sense. When
used in the immunity context the term refers not only to adjudicative functions
performed by administrative bodies but also to duties performed by nonjudicial
officials who participate in judicial proceedings, such as prosecuting attorneys,
and jurors, and to many other functions demanding the exercise of judgment
and discretion.
Comment, 44 CALIM. L. Rv. 887, 888 n.14 (1956).
26. 12 F.2d 396 (2d Cir. 1926), aff'd per curiam, 275 U.S. 503 (1927).
27. Id. at 402.
28. Comment, 18 ARK. L. Rlv. 81, 88 (1964); see 73 U. PA. L. Rxv. 300 (1925).
29. E.g., Andrews v. Murphy, 349 F.2d 114 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 999(1965); Scolnick v. Lefkowitz, 329 F.2d 716 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 825(1964); Rhodes v. Meyer, 334 F.2d 709 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 915 (1964) ;
Harmon v. Superior Court of California, 329 F.2d 154 (9th Cir. 1964) ; Kostal v.
Stoner, 292 F.2d 492 (10th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 868 (1962); Stift v.
Lynch, 267 F.2d 237 (7th Cir. 1959); Laughlin v. Rosenman, 163 F.2d 838 (D.C.
Cir. 1947).
30. See Robichaud v. Ronan, 351 F.2d 533 (9th Cir. 1965) ; Corsican Productions
v. Pitchess, 338 F.2d 441 (9th Cir. 1964); Lewis v. Brautigam, 227 F.2d 124 (5th
Cir. 1955).
31. See Robichaud v. Ronan, supra note 30; Lewis v. Brautigam, supra note 30.
32. The United States Supreme Court has not dealt with the question of the
prosecutor's immunity in actions under § 1983.
[VOL. 12
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adhere to the guidelines presented in Bauers. He is given the same im-
munity enjoyed by judges and is protected when the acts complained of
are not done in the total absence of jurisdiction. 33
It is submitted that the scope of the prosecuting attorney's immunity
should be re-evaluated. Complete immunity to all officials would eliminate
whatever remaining effectiveness is present in the Civil Rights Act84 since
the "under color" provision of the act can be fulfilled generally only by a
state official.8 5 The standard followed in Bauers prescribing complete im-
munity with only a jurisdictional limitation beckons toward total emascu-
lation of section 1983.
With the Bauers case, the only clear distinctions among officers par-
ticipating in the judicial process have been by-passed.8 6 Several factors
justify the distinctions. Judges are assumed to be neutral and careful to
protect the rights of litigants while prosecutors are generally viewed as
partisans.8 7 The need to protect the aura of authority and thus attain a
point of finality in litigation"8 is a powerful justification for the judge's
immunity and applies little to the prosecutor. Moreover, the same reasons
advanced for providing immunity to the prosecuting attorney apply like-
wise, although with lesser force, to many other officials in the judicial
process who also would be deterred,89 their time consumed, 40 and their
independence affected.41 By granting complete immunity to the prosecut-
ing attorney for acts within the scope of his jurisdiction, the courts have
opened the door to the granting of a similar immunity to all officers par-
ticipating in the judicial process. It is necessary to temper any developing
trend toward the wholesale granting of immunity since the individual whose
rights have been violated deserves some form of redress.4 2
Bauers held that complete immunity with only a jurisdictional limita-
tion was warranted by the judicial nature of the prosecutor's duties and
the vast amount of discretion exercised by him. 43 Several courts base the
33. See Sires v. Cole, 320 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1963) ; Jennings v. Nester, 217 F.2d
153 (7th Cir. 1955) ; Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1949) ; see also
note 24 supra.
34. Hoffman v. Holden, 268 F.2d 280 (9th Cir. 1959), overruled on another issue
by Cohen v. Norris, 300 F.2d 24 (9th Cir. 1962).
35. Jobson v. Henne, 355 F.2d 129, 133 (2d Cir. 1966).
36. Some of these officers are: court appointed deposition officers: Sarelos v.
Sheehan, 353 F.2d 5 (7th Cir. 1965) ; bailiffs: Haldane v. Chagnon, 345 F.2d 601 (9th
Cir. 1965) ; clerks of court: Rhodes v. Meyer, 334 F.2d 709 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 915 (1964) , court reporters: Peckham v. Scanlon, 241 F.2d 761 (7th Cir.
1957) ; see also note 25 supra.
37. Comment, 39 N.Y.U.L. Rzv. 839, 854 (1964).
38. See note 16, no. 13, supra.
39. Id. at no. 2.
40. Id. at no. 3.
41. Id. at no. 1.
42. See Note, 66 HARV. L. Rpv. 1285, 1298 (1953).
43. 361 F.2d at 589-90. Consider also: "The authority vested in him by law
to refuse on his own judgment alone to prosecute a complaint or indictment enables
him to end any criminal proceeding without appeal and without the approval of
another official." Attorney General v. Tufts, 239 Mass. 458, 489, 132 N.E. 322,
326 (1921).
FALL 1966]
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granting of immunity on the discretionary nature of the official's duties. 44
While this standard would restrict the application of the immunity doctrine
since many officials have primarily ministerial duties, it is logically unsound
for two reasons :45 (1) the distinction between a ministerial and a discre-
tionary function is not susceptible to precise determination, 46 and (2)
valid arguments may be made supporting immunity for both types of
activity. It could be argued that officials exercising discretion should be
immune in order to encourage independence and effective performance of
duties 47 while those performing ministerial functions warrant immunity
because of the injustice of imposing liability on subordinate officials who
are acting in conformity with an order from an immune superior. 48
Two further limitations should have been imposed on the scope of the
prosecuting attorney's immunity by the court in the Bauers case. Although
their imposition would not have affected the result reached in the case,
these limitations would restrict and clarify the scope of immunity. The
following proposals would not unduly burden the prosecuting attorney and
would, on the contrary, encourage effective and efficient performance of
duties. Moreover, they should be applied to other officials who participate
in the judicial process.
Acts by the prosecuting attorney which are engendered by malice
should not be palliated by the immunity doctrine. In Bauers, malice was
not alleged and the court did not consider it. Apparently, there has been
only one case where relief was granted when one of the violations involved
the commission of malicious acts clearly within the scope of the prosecut-
ing attorney's jurisdiction. In Robichaud v. Ronan,49 it was alleged that
defendant, a prosecuting attorney, maliciously refused to drop murder
charges which allegedly were not based on probable cause.50 However,
the court based its decision on the prosecutor's attempt to coerce a con-
fession which was an act investigatory in nature, 1 and thus might have
been viewed as outside the scope of his jurisdiction.5 2 On the other hand,
an overwhelming majority of cases has held that the allegation of malice
does not destroy the prosecuting attorney's immunity. 83 This is based on
44. United States ex rel. McNeill v. Tarumianz, 141 F. Supp. 739, 741 (D. Del.
1956), af'd, 242 F.2d 191 (3d Cir. 1957) ; Comment, 36 IND. L.J. 317, 339 (1961).
Support for this standard is found in Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880) wherein
it was held that a judge is not immune from prosecution for discriminatory practices
in the selection of jurors because this is a ministerial duty.
45. See Jennings, Tort Liability of Administrative Officers, 21 MINN. L. Rnv.
263, 301 (1937).
46. Comment, 44 CALMP. L. Riv. 887, 888 (1956).
47. See generally note 16 supra.
48. Francis v. Lyman, 216 F.2d 583 (1st Cir. 1954); see Comment, 44 CALIV.
L. Rxv. 887, 888-89 N. 18 (1956).
49. 351 F.2d 533 (9th Cir. 1965).
50. Brief for plaintiff-appellant, p. 17, Robichaud v. Ronan, supra note 49.
51. 351 F.2d at 537.
52. The court may have classified the malicious abuse of the prosecuting attorney's
investigatory function as in the "absence of jurisdiction." See Lewis v. Brautigam,
227 F.2d 124 (5th Cir. 1955).
53. E.g., Sires v. Cole, 320 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1963) ; Stift v. Lynch, 267 F.2d
237 (7th Cir. 1959) ; Eaton v. Bibb, 217 F.2d 446 (7th Cir. 1955) (by implication) ;
[VOL. 12
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the reasoning that it would be impossible to determine whether the allega-
tions were well founded until the case had been tried and thus innocent
officials would be subjected to the burdens and dangers of litigation.54
However, it has been suggested that this problem can be minimized by
providing punishment for false allegations and sending to trial only those
complaints showing clear abuses.5 Such a limitation would deter and
restrict the independence5 6 of only corrupt officials. The only effect it
would have on honest officials would be the consumption of time 57 which
could be minimized by the procedure. The public interest is hardly advanced
by ignoring corruption in office and allowing wrongs to remain unremedied.
In addition, or alternatively, the complete quasi-judicial immunity of
the prosecuting attorney should not be extended to acts which are investi-
gatory as opposed to judicial in nature. In the Bauers case, the acts of
the prosecuting attorney were quite clearly judicial in nature58 and thus
the court was not called upon to impose such a limitation. The jurisdic-
tional limitation accepted by most of the courts would be encompassed and
expanded by a functional basis for determining the liability of the prosecut-
ing attorney. The expansion would be accomplished by subjecting the
prosecuting attorney to liability for acts which are within the scope of his
authority but which are not judicial in nature.59 This is an area of some
confusion because the courts have not adequately defined the jurisdic-
tional limitation.60
Moreover, in addition to malicious acts, relief should also be granted
for negligent and innocent deprivation of rights, when caused by conduct
not judicial in nature. The burden on the prosecutor can be relieved by a
system where the state compensates him to the extent of his liability 1 or
requires him to secure personal liability insurance with the expense borne
by the state. 62 Thus the injured would be relieved and the prosecutor
would not be unduly burdened.
It is urged that the Third Circuit not extend the principle of Bauers
beyond its facts and adopt the foregoing limitations on judicial immunity
at the opportune time.
Jay Rose
Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1949) ; Laughlin v. Rosenman, 163 F.2d 838(D.C. Cir. 1947) (dictum).
54. Gregoire v. Biddle, supra note 53 at 581.
55. Brief for plaintiff-appellant, p. 14, Robichaud v. Ronan, 351 F.2d 533 (9th
Cir. 1965).
56. See note 16, no. 1, supra.
57. See note 16, no. 3, supra.
58. Prosecuting the plaintiff as an adult instead of as a juvenile involved a dis-
cretionary decision within the judicial process. See also note 25 supra.
59. For a discussion of the investigatory functions of the prosecuting attorney see
Robichaud v. Ronan, 351 F.2d 533 (9th Cir. 1965) ; Barrett, Police Practices and the
Law - From Arrest to Release on Charge, 50 CALI. L. Rgv. 11, 16-24 (1962).
60. See note 52 supra.
61. See Note, 48 Nw. U.L. Rgv. 377 (1953) (discussion of the Illinois Reimburse-
ment statute).
62. See 98 U. PA. L. Rzv. 936 (1950) ; 15 N.C.L. Rv. 426 (1937).
FALL 1966]
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS -
STATE CANNOT DEPRIVE AN INDIVIDUAL OF JURY REVIEW OF CIVIL
COMMITMENT DECISION OR JUDICIAL DETERMINATION OF DANGEROUS
PROPENSITIES SOLELY ON GROUND THAT HE IS PRESENTLY SERVING
PENAL SENTENCE.
Baxstrom v. Herold (U.S. 1966)
Petitioner was convicted of second degree assault in April 1959 and
was sentenced to a term of two and one-half to three years in a New
York prison. On June 1, 1961, he was certified as insane by a prison
physician and transferred to Dannemora State Hospital, an institution
maintained by the State Department of Correction and used for the con-
finement and care of male prisoners declared mentally ill while serving
a criminal sentence. In November 1961, the director of Dannemora filed
a petition in the Surrogate's Court of Clinton County stating that peti-
tioner's penal sentence was about to terminate and requesting that he be
civilly committed pursuant to section 384 of the New York Correction
Law.1 The Surrogate certified that petitioner was possibly in need of in-
stitutional care and on December 18, 1961, the expiration date of his penal
sentence, custody over him shifted from the Department of Correction to
the Department of Mental Hygiene but he was retained at Dannemora. 2
Petitioner twice sought writs of habeas corpus in the state courts,
alleging that he was sane, or if insane, he should be transferred from
Dannemora to a civil mental hospital. Both writs were dismissed. On
appeal to the Appellate Division, Third Department, the denial of the latter
was affirmed without opinion,8 and a motion for leave to appeal to the Court
of Appeals of New York was denied.4 The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari and reversed, holding that petitioner was denied equal
protection of the laws since the procedures provided by section 74 of the
New York Mental Hygiene Law5 allow a person to be civilly committed at
1. As it appeared when applied to petitioner in 1961, N.Y. CORRECTION LAW
§ 384 provided in part:
1. Within thirty days prior to the expiration of the term of a prisoner confined
in the Dannemora State Hospital, when in the opinion of the director such
prisoner continues insane, the director shall apply to a judge of a court of record
for the certification of such person as provided in the mental hygiene law for the
certification of a person not in confinement on a criminal charge. The court in
which such proceedings are instituted shall, if satisfied that such person may
require care and treatment in an institution for the mentally ill, issue an order
directing that such person be committed to the custody of the commissioner of
mental hygiene to be placed in an appropriate state institution of the department
of mental hygiene or of the department of correction as may be designated for
the custody of such person by agreement between the heads of the two departments.
2. Baxstrom's retention at Dannemora was in consequence of the Department
of Mental Hygiene having already determined ex parte that he was not suitable for
care in a civil hospital.
3. People ex rel. Baxstrom v. Herold, 21 A.D.2d 754, 251 N.Y.S.2d 938 (1964).
4. People ex rel. Baxstrom v. Herold, 14 N.Y.2d 490, 253 N.Y.S.2d 1028, 202
N.E.2d 159 (1964).
5. N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENn LAW § 74 grants the right to de novo review by jury
trial of a determination made concerning the insanity of all persons civilly committed
other than those committed at the expiration of a penal term.
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the expiration of his penal sentence without the jury review available to all
other persons civilly committed in New York. Petitioner also was denied
equal protection of the laws by the failure to afford him the same judicial
determination of criminal insanity granted all others before their commit-
ment to an institution maintained by the Department of Correction.
Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966).
The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment has primarily
been used to invalidate discriminatory legislation and functions as a limita-
tion upon permissible legislative classifications. In using the clause to com-
bat discriminatory legislation the United States Supreme Court has estab-
lished its right to pierce the faqade of disputed legislation and discover the
fairness of its actual enforcement.7 It has also exercised the right to
evaluate legislative classifications to determine whether they are so unrea-
sonable that they become discriminatory in nature.8
Since the passage of the fourteenth amendment, the courts have con-
stantly been faced with the problem of evaluating the classifications that are
the bases upon which most legislation is grounded. Following the amend-
ment's ratification, the Supreme Court affirmed the right of state legisla-
tures to pass "special" legislation, recognizing that the states could not be
compelled to run all their laws in the channels of general legislation,9 for
such a directive would invalidate any effort to promote the general welfare
of the state through the use of its police power. 10
State legislation also enjoys the benefit of a presumption of reasonable-
ness when the validity of a legislative classification is attacked." There-
fore, if any state of facts reasonably could be conceived that would sustain
the classification in question, there is a presumption of the existence of that
state of facts. 12 Similarly, an individual assailing the classification has the
burden to show that the legislative action is actually arbitrary, 8 and not
6. N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW § 85.
7. See Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935) ; Reagan v. Farmers Loan and
Trust Co., 154 U.S. 420 (1894) ; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1885) ; Neal v.
Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 (1881) ; Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880) ; Henderson
v. Mayor of the City of New York, 92 U.S. 259 (1876); Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92
U.S. 275 (1876).
8. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
9. Bachtel v. Wilson, 204 U.S. 36 (1907).
10. See Barbier v. Conolly, 113 U.S. 27, 31-32 (1885), wherein Mr. Justice Field
writing for the Court noted:
Special burdens are often necessary for general benefits, - for supplying
water, preventing fires, lighting districts, cleaning streets, opening parks, and many
other objects. Regulations for these purposes may press with more or less weight
upon one than another, but they are designed, not to impose unequal or unnecessary
restrictions upon any one, but to promote, with as little individual inconvenience as
possible, the general good. Though, in many respects, necessarily special in their
character, they do not furnish just ground of complaint if they operate alike upon
all persons and property under the same circumstances and conditions.
11. Salsburg v. Maryland, 346 U.S. 545 (1954).
12. Borden's Farm Products Co. v. Baldwin, 293 U.S. 194 (1934). See also
Independent Dairymen's Ass'n v. City and County of Denver, 142 F.2d 940 (10th Cir.
1944) ; Hayes v. United States, 112 F.2d 417 (10th Cir. 1940).
13. Linsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911).
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merely possibly SO,1 4 for a certain deference is shown to the state legislature's
sensitivity to practical problems and circumstances within its jurisdiction.15
As the instant case illustrates, the legislative right of classification is
not without constitutional limitations. Although the fourteenth amendment
does not require that things different in fact be treated in law as though
they were the same,' 6 it does require that those who are similarly situated
be similarly treated.17 Accordingly, in Skinner v. Oklahoma,18 the Court
invalidated Oklahoma's Habitual Criminal Sterlization Act, which pre-
scribed sterilization for those persons convicted two or more times of
crimes "amounting to felonies involving moral turpitude," who were there-
after convicted of such a felony in Oklahoma and sentenced to an Okla-
homa penal institution. Offenses arising out of the violation of the pro-
hibitory laws, revenue acts, embezzlement, or political offenses, however,
were designated exceptions within the statute. The Court explained that:
Sterilization of those who have thrice committed grand larceny with
immunity for those who are embezzlers is a clear, pointed, unmistak-
able discrimination. . . . We have not the slightest basis for in-
ferring that [the substantive distinction between larceny and embezzle-
ment] . . . has any significance in eugenics nor that the inheritability
of criminal traits follows the neat legal distinction which the law has
marked between those two offenses. . . .The equal protection clause
would indeed be a formula of empty words if such conspicuously
artificial lines could be drawn.1
Consequently, although the power of classification has often been up-
held "whenever such classification proceeds upon any difference which has
a reasonable relation to the object sought to be accomplished," 20 it cannot
be upheld if it rests on not real, but illusory differences, or if classificatory
distinctions have little relevance to the purpose for which the classifica-
tions are made.21
14. See Bachtel v. Wilson, 204 U.S. 36 (1907) ; Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U.S. 553
(1931) ; Frost v. Corporation Comm'n, 278 U.S. 515 (1929).
15. Patstone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 138, 144-45 (1914). Mr. Justice Holmes,
upholding a Pennsylvania law making it unlawful for any unnaturalized foreign-born
resident to kill any wild bird or animal, except in defense of property, and to that end
making it unlawful for such foreign-born persons to own or be possessed of a shotgun
or rifle, stated:
Obviously the question, so stated, is one of local experience, on which this court
ought to be very slow to declare that the state legislature was wrong on its
facts . . .it is enough that this court has no such knowledge of local conditions as
to be able to say that it was manifestly wrong. (Citations omitted.)
16. Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141 (1940). Here the Court upheld a Texas statute
that exempted agricultural groups from the same criminal sanctions imposed on in-
dustralists and commercial middlemen engaged in monopolistic activities. The Court
reasoned that the statutory classification was not violative of the equal protection clause,
for a state could properly differentiate between groups whose activities were so dis-
similar that they had substantially different effects on the welfare of the state.
17. See note 9 supra; see also Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the
Laws, 37 CALIM. L. Riv. 341, 344 (1949), who suggest that "the measure of the rea-
sonableness of a classification is the degree of its success in treating similarly those
similarly situated."
18. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
19. Id. at 541-42.
20. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R.R. v. Matthews, 174 U.S. 96 (1899).
21. Walters v. City of St. Louis, 347 U.S. 231, 237 (1954).
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The Court in the instant case was presented with a statutory scheme
which both withheld a jury review of a judicial determination of mental
competency to those committed at the expiration of a penal term and which
denied them a judicial proceeding to determine whether they were so dan-
gerously mentally ill that they required detention in an institution main-
tained by the Department of Correction. By invalidating both procedures
as the product of an unreasonable classification, 22 the Court based its de-
cision on a well reasoned body of precedent demanding that any differences
in rights and liabilities be founded upon a reasonable relation between the
purpose of the law and the characteristics of the group that is singled out
for distinctive treatment.23
The equal protection clause does not require identity of treatment,24
but only that the disparities within a law have a reasonable basis.25 The
procedures under examination in the instant case were methods by which
the State of New York attempted to prolong its control over individuals
serving penal sentences whom it considered presented essentially different
custodial problems from those who were committed from a purely civilian
context. Under these circumstances, the judgment of the state legislature
should receive a certain presumption of reasonableness. 26 Because those
serving penal sentences have been shown to have antisocial tendencies not
common to all persons civilly committed, a legislative determination based
on this fact might in a context not related to procedural safeguards for the
mentally ill have merited judicial approbation.27
It is therefore suggested that the Court was in part motivated by an
unexpressed concern for the more controversial problems underlying com-
mitment procedures, although a logically sound disposition of the case under
the equal protection clause was justified by the peculiar manner chosen by
the New York legislature to execute its judgment based on the differences
between mentally ill prisoners and civilians.2 8
22. Discussing the classification which denied those serving penal sentences the
right to a jury review, Mr. Chief Justice Warren noted:
For purposes of granting judicial review before a jury of the question whether
a person is mentally ill and in need of institutionalization, there is no basis for
distinguishing the commitment of a person who is nearing the end of a penal
term from all other civil commitments.
383 U.S. at 111-12.
In dismissing the argument that Baxstrom's dangerous (i.e., "criminal") tendencies
were established by the fact that he was presently serving a penal sentence for a
criminal offense (hence eliminating the necessity of a judicial hearing on the issue),
the Court noted:
A person with a past criminal record is presently entitled to a hearing on the
question whether he is dangerously mentally ill so long as he is not in prison at
the time civil commitment proceedings are instituted. Given this distinction, all
semblance of rationality of the classification, purportedly based upon criminal
propensities, disappears.
383 U.S. at 115.
23. See notes 17, 19 and 20 supra.
24. See note 15 supra.
25. See note 16 supra.
26. See note 14 supra.
27. But see note 22 supra.
28. While the underlying reasons for the classification were not wholly arbitrary,
the implementation of the statutory scheme worked unreasonable results such as the
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The due process problems raised by civil commitment procedures are
epitomized in the respective positions taken by the medical profession,
which has constantly advocated commitment procedures with as little legal
formality as possible, and the legal profession which has often expressed
concern that current modes of commitment ignore what it considers funda-
mental protections of personal freedom.29 Confronted with such conflicting
considerations, the courts have shown little uniformity in their interpreta-
tions of the procedures that meet due process standards. This lack of uni-
formity is illustrated by the fact that although the Supreme Court has often
recognized that notice of allegations and an opportunity to be heard are
essential ingredients of a "fair" proceeding,8° state procedures, unlike
those in the instant case, have been upheld which grant no notice or hearing
until after the individual has been hospitalized."'
In Baxstrom, the Court was given an opportuntiy to shed some light on
this troubled area. The Court's studious avoidance of the complex prob-
lems of due process, 82 however, is exemplified by its failure to consider the
extensive arguments presented by petitioner's counsel urging a due process
requirement of right to counsel at a sanity hearing.88 By refusing to take
any position on this question, which has been so thoroughly examined in
criminal proceedings, the Court has regrettably shown its willingness to
postpone any explicit determinations in this confused area of due process.
It is suggested, however, that despite its reluctance to specifically out-
line any due process requirements, the Court's uneasiness with prevalent
commitment procedures is made evident 84 by its readiness to insure the
fact that a prisoner adjudged insane while serving a sentence for forgery or em-
bezzlement would be denied a hearing on the question of his dangerous propensities
(for the statute assumes he is dangerous because he is presently in a penal institution
serving a criminal sentence), while a person with a past record of conviction for crimes
involving physical violence would be entitled to such a hearing solely because he is
not in prison when the commitment procedures are initiated.
29. See Weihofen & Overholser, Commitment Of the Mentally I1, 24 Trx.
L. Rnv. 307, 336-48 (1946), for a discussion of the requisites of notice, presence at
the hearing, and the right of trial by jury. See generally, Kittrie, Compulsory Mental
Treatment and the Requirements of "Due Process," 21 OHIO ST. L.J. 28 (1960);
Ross, Commitment of the Mentally Ill: Problems of Law and Policy, 57 MICH. L.
REv. 945 (1958-1959) ; Comment, Analysis of Legal and Medical Consideration in
Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 56 YALE L.J. 1178 (1947).
30. E.g., Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
31. E.g., In the Matter of Coates, 9 N.Y.2d 242, 213 N.Y.S.2d 74, 173 N.E.2d 797,
appeal dismissed sub nom. Coates v. Walters, 368 U.S. 34 (1961). Contra, State
ex rel. Fuller v. Mullinax, 346 Mo. 858, 269 S.W.2d 72 (1954) ; In re Lambert, 134
Cal. 626, 66 Pac. 851 (1901).
32. The Court in Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942), followed a
course similar to that taken in Baxstrom by avoiding issues of due process and cruel
and unusual punishment in favor of a disposition based on unreasonable statutory
classifications.
33. Brief for Petitioner pp. 11-20.
34. That the underlying "principle" of Baxstrom may well be based on due
process of law and be more pervasive than the narrowly based opinion would indicate
is suggested by its application in the following Memorandum opinion of the New York
Court of Appeals:
In our view, the principle of Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107; Gideon v. Wain-
wright, 372 U.S. 335; Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353; Lane v. Brown, 372
U.S. 477; Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, and of similar cases, demonstrates that
[VOL. 12
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equal application of whatever safeguards have already been instituted by
the various states. 5 It is hoped that Baxstrom is but the initial step in a
sorely needed examination of the constitutional questions presented by
present civil commitment procedures.
James D. Hutchinson
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION AND CROSS-
EXAMINATION - COMMITMENT PROCEEDING UNDER THE BARR-
WALKER ACT IS CRIMINAL, THEREBY REQUIRING RIGHT TO CON-
FRONTATION AND CROSS-EXAMINATION OF ADVERSE WITNESSES.
United States ex rel. Gerchman v. Maroney (3d Cir. 1966)
Petitioner pleaded guilty to a charge of assault with intent to ravish
on an indictment that charged him with assault and battery, indecent assault
and assault with intent to ravish. At the sentencing, the trial judge invoked
the Barr-Walker Act1 and committed petitioner for psychiatric examina-
tion in accordance with the provisions of that statute.2 The confidential
report submitted to the judge by the Commissioner of Mental Health in-
dicated that petitioner, although not mentally ill, would pose a potential
threat of bodily harm to the community if allowed to remain at large.8
The judge then committed petitioner for an indeterminate sentence as
prescribed by the Barr-Walker Act.
Eleven months later, petitioner sought a writ of habeas corpus alleg-
ing that the act was unconstitutional on its face and, as applied to him, was
violative of due process and the equal protection of the laws. The sentenc-
an indigent mental patient, who is committed to an institution, is entitled, in a
habeas corpus proceeding, (brought to establish his sanity), to the assignment
of counsel as a matter of constitutional right.
Rogers v. Stanley, 17 N.Y.2d 256, 217 N.E.2d 636 (1966).
35. The rule announced in the instant case led to eventual freedom for Baxstrom.
Shortly after the Court's decision, he was transferred to a civil hospital and was
again certified as insane and in need of further treatment (although not dangerously
insane). He requested a jury trial on the question of his insanity and was found by
the jury not to be insane and was released from custody. Letter from Leon B. Polsky,
Esq., Counsel for the Petitioner, to the Villanova Law Review, August 29, 1966.
1. PA. SrAT. ANN. tit. 19, §§ 1166-74 (Supp. 1965).
2. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, §§ 1167-68 (Supp. 1965).
3. United States ex rel. Gerchman v. Maroney, 355 F.2d 302, 306 (3d Cir. 1966).
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ing judge refused to grant the writ as did the Superior Court of Penn-
sylvania. 4 When the writ was again refused by the District Court for the
Western District of Pennsylvania, 5 appeal was taken to the Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit where, by a unanimous vote, the court granted
the writ, holding that the Barr-Walker commitment proceedings were
criminal in nature and, therefore, the constitutional safeguards of confronta-
tion and cross-examination must be afforded the petitioner. United States
ex rel. Gerchman v. Maroney, 355 F.2d 302 (3d Cir. 1966).
Since 1937 more than half of the States and the District of Columbia
have passed statutes aimed at the sexual offender. Today, there are twenty-
nine jurisdictions with some form of sexual offender legislation. 6 The
underlying purposes of these statutes are: (1) to protect society from the
potentially dangerous sexual recidivist; and (2) to attempt cure and re-
habilitation of the sexual offender through special programs of psychiatric
treatment and special confinement.7
In 1951 Pennsylvania enacted such a statute, commonly referred to
as the Barr-Walker Act.8 This act provides that upon conviction of any
one of several named offenses,9 the convicted person may be bound over
for sixty days'0 to the Department of Public Welfare psychiatrist or to a
court-appointed psychiatrist, to assist the court in determining if such
person is mentally ill or, if left at large, would pose a threat of bodily harm
to the community." The act further provides: "Whenever a court, after
the psychiatric examination of and report on a person convicted . . . shall
be of the opinion that it would be to the best interests of justice to sentence
such person under the provisions of this act . . ,,u1 upon arraignment, the
indeterminate sentence of from one day to life must be imposed. 13
Under Pennsylvania law, a sentence for an indeterminate term is
deemed a sentence for the maximum term described in the law ;14 therefore,
an indeterminate sentence under the Barr-Walker Act is actually a life
4. Commonwealth ex rel. Gerchman v. Maroney, 203 Pa. Super. 293, 201 A.2d
319 (1964), allocatur denied, July 27, 1964.
5. United States ex rel. Gerchman v. Maroney, 235 F. Supp. 588 (W.D. Pa. 1964).
6. Alabama, California, Colorado, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Florida,
Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah,
Virginia, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, Wyoming. See Appendix,
Note, 41 NOTRE DAME LAW. 527, 558 (1966) for full citations. See also AMERICAN
BAR FOUNDATION, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW, Table X-B, 319-29(Lindman & McIntyre ed. 1961) for complete breakdown on the statutes and
their provisions.
7. Note, 41 NOTRE DAmE LAW. 527-28 (1966).
8. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, §§ 1166-74 (Supp. 1965).
9. Indecent assault, incest, assault with intent to commit sodomy, solicitation to
commit sodomy, sodomy, assault with intent to ravish or rape. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19,
§ 1166 (Supp. 1965).
10. Upon request by the psychiatric examiner to the court, the period may be
increased to ninety days. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 1168(a) (Supp. 1965).
11. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, §§ 1166-68 (Supp. 1965).
12. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 1170(a) (Supp. 1965) (emphasis added).
13. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 1166 (Supp. 1965).
14. Commonwealth ex rel. Carmelo v. Smith, 347 Pa. 495, 32 A.2d 913, 914 (1943).
[VOL. 12
14
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 12, Iss. 1 [1966], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol12/iss1/5
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
sentence. Furthermore, "exclusive control" over the convict is placed with
the Board of Parole. 15 Even if he were to be paroled, he would nonethe-
less remain subject to the Board of Parole for the remainder of his natural
life because of the indeterminate sentence rule. 6
Traditionally, sex offender statutes have been treated as civil proceed-
ings, analogous to sentencing hearings or commitments of the insane. 17
The theory is that the sexual offender is the beneficiary of this commitment
and treatment, and that the state stands in the position of parens patriae.
The traditional safeguards of due process in criminal proceedings were thus
considered unnecessary.1 8 In recent years, however, there has been grow-
ing concern about the hazards of such a theoretical position. 19 The poten-
tiality of life imprisonment, coupled with the inadequacy of facilities
specially designed to treat the sex offender, has caused the courts in some
jurisdictions to require minimum standards of procedure in the commit-
ment of sex offenders under these statutes. 20
As early as 1938 the Michigan Supreme Court in People v. Frontczak2l
overturned such a sexual offender statute as a violation of due process
under the Michigan constitution. In discussing this statute, which was
part of Michigan's code of criminal procedure, the court noted that: "When
the law penalizes an overt act it cannot, under criminal procedure and
under the guise of hospitalization, in another court and a different juris-
diction, try him on the footing of his conviction elsewhere and add to or
subtract or change his sentence. '22 The court specifically distinguished
this proceeding from an insanity hearing since jurisdiction in the latter
case attaches only by reason of the accused's insanity, whereas under the
sex offender statute, jurisdiction accrues only after conviction and the
determination of sanity.23 Shortly after the law was declared unconstitu-
tional, the Michigan legislature passed a new law which was not a part of
15. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 1173 (Supp. 1965).
16. Commonwealth ex rel. Banks v. Cain, 345 Pa. 581, 28 A.2d 897, 899 (1942).
17. Miller v. Overholser, 206 F.2d 415, 417 (D.C. Cir. 1953) ; Gross v. Superior
Court, 42 Cal. 2d 816, 820, 270 P.2d 1025, 1028 (1954) ; People v. Chapman, 301 Mich.
584, 596, 4 N.W.2d 18, 26 (1942) ; State ex rel. Sweezer v. Green, 360 Mo. 1249, 232
S.W.d 897 (1950).
18. See, e.g., Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court, 309 U.S. 270 (1940)
People v. Chapman, 301 Mich. 584, 4 N.W.2d 18 (1942).
19. See, e.g., Gross v. Superior Court, 42 Cal. 2d 816, 270 P.2d 1025 (1954);
People v. Beshears, 65 111. App. 2d 446, 213 N.E.2d 55 (1965). See also Note, 41
NOTRE DAME LAW. 527 (1966); 100 U. PA. L. Rev. 727 (1952) ; 13 U. PITT. L. Rgv.
739 (1952).
20. See Gross v. Superior Court, 42 Cal. 2d 816, 821, 270 P.2d 1025, 1027-28(1954), holding that a finding of sexual psychopathy may be appealed and the cost
of the transcript of record must be paid for by the state, because the person's liberty
is at stake and the state is his opponent, thus similar to a criminal proceeding;
Commonwealth v. Page, 339 Mass. 313, 317, 159 N.E.2d 82, 85 (1959), requiring
that in order to maintain its nonpenal character the treatment facilities for sexual
offenders must have been established.
21. 286 Mich. 51, 281 N.W. 534 (1938).
22. Id. at 58, 281 N.W. at 536.
23. Id. at 59, 281 N.W. at 537.
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the criminal code, but which was substantially the same as the prior act.
In 1942 this law was upheld as a civil proceeding in People v. Chapman.24
The Supreme Court of the United States had an opportunity to con-
sider the constitutionality of a similar Minnesota statute in 1940 in Minne-
sota ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court.25 The petitioner in that case con-
tended that the statute violated the equal protection clause because the
classification of sex offenders was not rational and, in addition, claimed
that the procedural safeguards required under the due process clause were
lacking. The Court decided that it was within the power of the legislature
to deal with the evils of society by assigning them degrees of harm and
treating them accordingly. 26 Consequently, it held that the classification
was reasonable. While other criminal offenses might be just as grave and
in need of special treatment, the Court held that this alone did not destroy
the validity of the sex offender statute.27 The Court dismissed the pro-
cedural challenges as premature, with the caveat that such subtleties as the
law contained could be used to abuse the constitutional rights and privileges
of the sex offender, thus opening the door to a reconsideration of the consti-
tutionality by the Court in the event such abuses did occur.2 8
Legal scholars have not been alone in their attacks on the sex offender
legislation. These statutes have been the subject of much criticism by the
medical profession as well. Many of the statutes employ the term "psycho-
path" or "sexual psychopath" to classify the group of offenders covered
under the law. These terms have been much misused and, in a medical
sense, are said to be neither sufficiently explanatory nor adequately descrip-
tive.29 Moreover, such terms are rendered meaningless because of the
widely varying interpretations given to them by members of both the
medical and legal professions.80 Finally, the theory that sexual offenders
can be easily identified and classified together as a homogeneous group'
has been strongly attacked by medical experts.82
The deficiencies in sexual offender legislation do not result solely from
their own inadequacy. The facilities for treatment in many cases are almost
nonexistent and, as yet, very little is known about the kind of treatment
that sex offenders require. 88 In 1950 a group of New Jersey psychiatrists
24. 301 Mich. 584, 4 N.W.2d 18 (1942).
25. 309 U.S. 270 (1940).
26. Id. at 275.
27. Ibid.
28. Id. at 277.
29. Hacker & Frym, The Sexual Psychopath Act in Practice: A Critical Dis-
cussion, 43 CALIF. L. Rtv. 766 (1955).
30. Sadoff, Psychiatric Views of the Sexual Psychopath Statutes, 10 CORRnC'TIVZ
PSYCHIATRY AND J. oF SOCIAL THRAPY 242, 242-43 (1964).
31. GUTTMACH4R & W4IHOFXN, PSYCHIATRY AND TrHs LAW 111 (1952).
32. Id. at 111; Phillips & Slovenko, Psychosexuality and the Criminal Law, 15
VAND. L. Rev. 797, 823 (1962); Tappan, Some Myths about the Sexual Offender,
19 Fzo. PROD. 7, 10-11 (1955).
33. Note, 41 NoTRs DAMA LAW. 527, 552 (1966).
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reported that a desirable doctor-patient ratio would be one doctor for every
twenty-three patients. 84 In the same year, the California Assembly re-
ported that the hospital in California which received the majority of the
state's sexual psychopaths had eight doctors for 8,000 inmates.35
Consequently, it was with considerable controversy raging in both
medical and legal circles as to the validity and efficacy of these statutes
that the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit heard the Gerchman case.
The court cut through the mass of challenges to the law which had been
raised in the courts below and again on appeal, by determining that the
Barr-Walker Act involved an independent criminal proceeding.36 The
court agreed that if it were a simple sentencing procedure, no right to con-
frontation and cross-examination of adverse witnesses would be present.8 7
It noted that what requirements were present in civil commitment proceed-
ings were unclear. 8  By making analogy to the decision in Kennedy v.
Mendoza-Martine89 and two cases involving habitual criminal acts,40 the
court found that the conviction of one of the enumerated crimes under the
Barr-Walker Act was a prerequisite to the invocation of the law, but was
only subordinate to a new issue. The maximum penalty for the crime to
which petitioner had pleaded guilty was five years in jail. 41 To make a
new finding of fact as to his potential threat to society which would require
the judge to sentence him to an indeterminate term under the act 42 took
away the discretionary feature of judicial sentencing. 4 This factor, coupled
with the placement of the Barr-Walker Act in the section on criminal pro-
cedure,44 indicated to the court that this was a criminal proceeding.
Following the Supreme Court opinions in Pointer v. Texas45 and Douglas
v. Alabama,46 which held that the rights of confrontation and cross-exami-
nation basic to a fair trial under the sixth amendment are obligatory on
34. Report, N.J. COMMISSION ON THE HABITUAL SEx OFFENDER 59 (1950), as
cited in 100 U. PA. L. REv. 727, 739 n.95 (1952).
35. CALIFORNIA ASSEMBLY SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEX CRIMES, COMMITTEE ON
JUDICIAL SYSTEM AND JUDICIAL PROCESS, PRELIMINARY REPORT 97 (1950), as cited
in 100 U. PA. L. REv. 727, 740 n.98 (1952).
36. United States ex rel. Gerchman v. Maroney, 355 F.2d 302, 312 (3d Cir. 1966).
37. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
38. Greenwood v. United States, 350 U.S. 366 (1956).
39. 372 U.S. 144 (1963) (the draft evasion conviction was preliminary to, but
separate from, the denationalization procedure which was penal).
40. Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448 (1962) ; Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 3 (1954)(habitual offenders acts create new criminal offenses, thereby requiring notice and
a hearing and the procedural safeguards of a criminal trial on the issue of identity).
41. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4722 (Supp. 1965).
42. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 1166 (Supp. 1965). Under the act, once the judge
finds the person a threat and invokes the act, the only sentence he may impose is from
one day to life. There is no discretion allowed the judge; it now passes to the Board
of Parole. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 1173 (Supp. 1965).
43. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949) [as cited in United States
ex rel. Gerchman v. Maroney, 355 F.2d 302, 312 n.13 (3d Cir. 1966)].
44. Title 19 is the Pennsylvania title on criminal procedure.
45. 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
46. 380 U.S. 415 (1965).
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the States through the fourteenth amendment, the Court of Appeals estab-
lished this requirement for the Barr-Walker procedure. Writing for the
court, Judge Freedman said: "The effort of enlightened penology to
alleviate the condition of a convicted defendant by providing some elements
of advanced, modern methods of cure and rehabilitation and possible ulti-
mate release on parole cannot be turned about so as to deprive a defendant
of the procedure which the due process clause guarantees in a criminal
proceeding. '47 The court granted the writ, which was to be issued after
sixty days during which time the Commonwealth had the opportunity to
proceed against the petitioner under the new rules.4 8
The position taken by the court regarding the criminal nature of the
Barr-Walker Act closely parallels the finding of the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court in Commonwealth ex rel. Dermendzin v. Myers,49 a case involving
the Habitual Criminal Act. Petitioner in this case had been sentenced to
twelve years for voluntary manslaughter and an additional twelve to twenty-
four years under the second offender section of the Habitual Criminal Act.50
The court found that the judge had the discretion to impose the additional
sentence and to fix its length.51 The court concluded, however, that because
of the factor of discretion, the defendant must have notice of the possible
additional sentence and an opportunity to be heard. "In other words, a
defendant's sentence may not be increased on the ground that he is a
second offender without a supporting judicial determination of the issue
of recidivism after the defendant has been informed of and had an oppor-
tunity to be heard in the premises." 52
Similarly, in a case involving a second offender under the Drug Act,
the Pennsylvania Superior Court held that "the trial court may not rely
upon its own record to come to its own conclusion on the fact of recidivism
without the convict's knowledge of what is taking place." 53
In proceedings under the Barr-Walker Act, one psychiatrist examines
the defendant.54 In making his decision, the judge relies solely on the
examiner's report, coupled with a recommendation by the Department of
Public Welfare on the place of commitment. Once he has determined that
commitment of the defendant under the Barr-Walker Act is "in the best
interests of justice,"55 his discretion is at an end. If the psychiatric report
47. United States ex rel. Gerchman v. Maroney, 355 F.2d 302, 310 (3d Cir. 1966).
48. Ibid.
49. 397 Pa. 607, 156 A.2d 804 (1959).
50. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5108 (Supp. 1965).
51. Commonwealth ex rel. Dermendzin v. Myers, 397 Pa. 607, 612, 156 A.2d 804,
807 (1959).
52. Id. at 613, 156 A.2d at 807.
53. Commonwealth ex rel. Lewis v. Keenan, 195 Pa. Super. 188, 192, 171 A.2d
895, 897 (1961).
54. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 1167 (Supp. 1965). No requirement is made for a
minimum of two or more psychiatrists.
55. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 1170(a) (Supp. 1965).
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is kept confidential, the defendant has no way of explaining or rebutting
the testimony of the psychiatrist. In addition, since the psychiatrist need
not be present in court, his hearsay testimony becomes the sole basis for
a life sentence instead of a five year term. Furthermore, the statute makes
no requirements nor sets forth any guidelines for the type of psychiatric
examination to be conducted. It merely says that a "complete psychiatric
examination" with a complete written report is to be submitted.5 6 There
is no definition of "qualified psychiatrist" nor are the qualifications of the
personnel to staff the facilities to be created under the Act by the Depart-
ment of Public Welfare enumerated.5 7 No cross reference is made to the
definitional terms set forth in the Mental Health Act.58 The Barr-Walker
Act was enacted without debate in either the House or Senate; moreover,
there is no record of hearings held or evidence taken. 59 Consequently,
no legislative history emerges which might aid in clarifying these points.
The decision by the court that a Barr-Walker commitment is a criminal
proceeding, subject to the safeguards of confrontation and cross-examina-
tion, opens the door to another troublesome area of inquiry. The act
provides for a psychiatric examination by order of the court. 60 Since this
is now declared to be a criminal proceeding, may a defendant be com-
pelled to undergo the psychiatric examination leading to his possible in-
carceration for life, without violating his fifth amendment privilege against
self-incrimination?
In 1965, in the midst of a sentencing proceeding under the Illinois
Sexually Dangerous Persons Act,6 ' the defendant was called as a witness
for the state.62 His attempts to invoke his privilege against self-incrimina-
tion in this hearing were rebuffed by the court. The appellate court over-
turned the proceeding under which he was committed, stating that even
though this was a civil proceeding, the privilege of the fifth amendment
applies to all testimonial compulsion.63 In addition, the hearsay evidence
of police concerning his arrest twice previously on similar charges was held
to be inadmissible. 64 Earlier, in 1949, a defendant who refused to undergo
a psychiatric examination under this act, claiming that it violated his fifth
amendment rights, was jailed in civil contempt.65 His imprisonment for
56. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 1167 (Supp. 1965).
57. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 1171 (Supp. 1965).
58. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 1072(3) (Supp. 1965). Psychiatrist is defined essen-
tially as a qualified physician who by reason of five years training and experience in
acquiring skills related to "mental and nervous disorders" has achieved professional
standing in the field of psychiatry.
59. Brief for the ACLU as Amicus Curiae, p. 20, United States ex rel. Gerchman
v. Maroney, 355 F.2d 302 (3d Cir. 1966).
60. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, §§ 1166, 1167, 1168 (Supp. 1965).
61. ILl. Rv. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 105-1.01-105-12 (Supp. 1965).
62. People v. Beshears, 65 Ill. App. 2d 446, 213 N.E.2d 55 (1965).
63. Id. at 458-59, 213 N.E.2d at 61.
64. Id. at 461, 213 N.E.2d at 62.
65. People v. Redlich, 402 I11. 270, 83 N.E.2d 736 (1949).
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civil contempt was upheld by the court, but the case was reversed on
other grounds.66
Some statutes, recognizing the problem of disclosure by the accused
of prior criminal conduct during the course of a psychiatric examination,
require that the examination be submitted to under penalty of contempt
of court, but make the psychiatric report incompetent evidence for other
than a determination of the subject's mental condition. 67 It is obvious that
if no psychiatric examination may be had, the purpose of the law is de-
feated. But at the same time, the candor of the patient and his willingness
to cooperate are requisite to a meaningful report. If the patient is reluctant
to answer for fear of reprisals and the examiner is hesitant to inquire for
fear of reaching an impasse in his examination, then nothing is gained by
the procedure. It seems clear that testifying in your own hearing as a state
witness would be barred by the fifth amendment if the proceeding is
deemed criminal. In Illinois this would apply even in a civil proceeding.68
The question remains as to what the Pennsylvania defendants under the
Barr-Walker Act can expect concerning the actual psychiatric examination.
This may depend in part on a close reading of the recent Supreme
Court opinion in Schmerber v. California69 concerning the problems sur-
rounding lie detector tests. If the colloquy between doctor and patient is
more important for what it says about the patient's mental characteristics
than for what the patient actually relates as fact, perhaps this is no more
than a fingerprinting of the mind. But since psychiatry is not nearly an
exact science which can be compared in its precision to fingerprinting, it
would seem that revelation of previous conduct is as crucial to the psychi-
atric report for what it reveals of the mind as it is for what it reveals of the
criminal or recidivistic conduct.
The Gerchman case has opened a new era in the field of sexual offender
statutes which will necessitate a reappraisal not only of the quality of the
laws medically, but of their impact on the constitutional rights of the sex
offender. By clearly placing this kind of proceeding in the criminal category,
the court has taken a significant step in the right direction. The instant
case stands as an important reminder to those legislators who would cure
age-old problems with swift and unreasoned action, that constitutional
standards must be maintained, regardless of the validity of the social
necessity for legislation.
Miriam L. Gafni
66. Id. at 278, 83 N.E.2d at 741.
67. See Note, 41 NOT" DAM4 LAW. 527, 547 & n.127 (1966).
68. See supra note 65.
69. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
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CORPORATIONS - APPRAISAL RIGHTS - DELAWARE CORPORATION
DENIED RIGHT TO INQUIRE INTO AUTHORITY OF REGISTERED NOMINEE-
SHAREHOLDER OR TO COMPEL IDENTIFICATION OF BENEFICIAL OWNERS
REPRESENTED.
Olivetti Underwood Corp. v. Jacques Coe & Co.
(Del. 1966)
The Delaware "short form" merger statute permits a parent corpora-
tion to merge with a subsidiary, in which it owns ninety per cent or more
of the outstanding capital stock, without the shareholder approval neces-
sary for "regular" mergers.' The merger plan may provide for the payment
of cash to minority shareholders of the subsidiary rather than issuance
of stock in the surviving corporation. Respondent, the Olivetti Underwood
Corporation, effected such a merger with its subsidiary, and petitioners
initiated proceedings for statutory appraisal and payment for their minority
registered shares.2 During the proceedings below, respondent was notified
that petitioners were stockbrokers allegedly holding the shares registered
in their names for certain unidentified beneficial owners. Respondent
adduced proof tending to show that many petitioners sought appraisal as
to only a portion of their shares, withholding other shares as to which the
merger was tacitly accepted. From an order of the Chancery Court
denying its demands that petitioners be required to submit proof of their
authority to demand appraisal and to reveal the beneficial owners' identities,
respondent appealed to the Supreme Court of Delaware which affirmed,
holding that a corporation cannot as a matter of right question the
authority of dissenters, known to be broker-nominees, to seek appraisal of
stock registered in their names, or compel disclosure of beneficial owners
represented. Olivetti Underwood Corp. v. Jacques Coe & Co., 217 A.2d
683 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1966).
A major question under the so-called appraisal statutes, which enable
a shareholder dissenting from a merger to have the surviving corporation
pay the fair value of his shares, is whether one must be the registered
holder of the stock in order to exercise the remedies conferred by the
statute. The problem most often arises in states where the term "share-
holder" is not statutorily defined to be the registered holder of shares.8
1. For purposes of this article, mergers may be divided into two categories:
"short form" and "regular." In Delaware, a short form merger may be effected
between parent and ninety per cent owned subsidiary by mere resolution of the parent's
board of directors. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 253 (Supp. 1964). In a regular merger,
the shareholders of the constituent corporations have voting rights in respect thereto.
2. See DAL. Coos ANN. tit. 8, § 262(c) (1953), made applicable to minority
shareholders dissenting from a short form merger by DEL. CODP ANN. tit. 8, § 253(e)(Supp. 1964).
3. In Ohio and Pennsylvania, the applicable corporation law expressly defines
the term "shareholder" as the registered holder of shares. OHIo REv. CODE ANN.§ 1701.01(F) (Page 1964) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2852-2 (Supp. 1965). In these
states, the courts have felt logically compelled to conclude that only registered holders
were intended by the legislature to fall within the definition of shareholder as that
term is used in the appraisal statute. See Clarke v. Rockwood & Co., 110 Ohio App. 38,
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Among such states, New York has continued to hold that the remedies
afforded by its appraisal statute shall accrue to the benefit of the "real"
owner of stock, whether or not such ownership appears of record. Con-
sequently, in New York, an unregistered beneficial owner4 or a voting
trust certificate holder5 may initiate appraisal proceedings. On the other
hand, the Superior Court of New Jersey has recently expressed a con-
trary view ;6 and Indiana law has been construed similarly. 7 In 1945, the
Supreme Court of Delaware, without the aid of statutory definition, held
in the landmark decision of Salt Dome Oil Corp. v. Schenck8 that only
a registered holder is a "shareholder" within the meaning of the Delaware
appraisal statute and, consequently, a corporation is entitled to refuse a
demand for appraisal made by a beneficial owner not of record. Delaware
courts have continued to adhere to the Salt Dome rule in analogous
situations.9
Related to the issue of whether an unregistered beneficial owner
qualifies for statutory appraisal is whether a corporation may impose any
conditions or restraints upon the appraisal rights of registered shareholders.
The New York position that the appraisal remedy accrues to the benefit
of the "real" owner of shares has been interpreted to countenance the
denial of appraisal rights to a registered holder shown not to be the actual
owner of the shares dissented.' 0 However, in In Re Northeastern Water
168 N.E.2d 592 (1959) (dictum) ; Kreher's Appeal, 379 Pa. 313, 108 A.2d 708 (1954) ;
Era Co. v. Pittsburgh Consolidation Coal Co., 355 Pa. 219, 49 A.2d 342 (1946).
Theoretically, the same rationale would seem applicable to other states statutorily
defining the word shareholder in terms of registration on the corporate books, especially
Virginia and California, where such explicit definition is found in the appraisal statute
itself and not merely in a "Definitions" section applicable throughout the particular
Business Corporation Act, as in other states. See VA. CoDg ANN. § 13.1-75 (1964) ;
CAL. CORP. CODE § 4303(b). Judicial interpretation of the matter in such states is,
however, lacking.
4. In the Matter of Deutschman, 281 App. Div. 14, 116 N.Y.S.2d 578 (1952)
In the Matter of Kaufman, Alsberg & Co., 30 Misc. 2d 1025, 220 N.Y.S.2d 151 (Sup.
Ct. 1961); Flagg-Utica Corp. v. Baselice, 14 Misc. 2d 476, 178 N.Y.S.2d 860 (Sup.
Ct. 1958); In the Matter of Friedman, 184 Misc. 639, 54 N.Y.S.2d 45 (Sup. Ct.),
modified, 269 App. Div. 834, 56 N.Y.S.2d 516 (1945) ; In the Matter of Bazar, 183
Misc. 736, 50 N.Y.S.2d 521 (Sup. Ct. 1944), aff'd, 271 App. Div. 1007, 60 N.Y.S.2d
910 (1947) ; In the Matter of Rowe, 107 Misc. 549, 176 N.Y. Supp. 753 (Sup. Ct. 1919).
5. In the Matter of Bacon, 287 N.Y. 1, 38 N.E.2d 105 (1941).
6. Bache & Co. v. General Instrument Corp., 74 N.J. Super. 92, 180 A.2d 535(1962). The facts presented here made it necessary for the court to decide only that a
registered shareholder is entitled to seek statutory appraisal, but, in a strong dictum,
the court expressed its opinion that the remedies afforded by the appraisal statute are
exercisable only by a registered shareholder. See 4 B.C. IND. & COMM. L. Rev. 192
(1962) ; 15 S.C.L.Q. 579 (1963).
7. In Lesch v. Chicago & E. Ill. R.R., 226 F.2d 687 (7th Cir. 1955), a federal court
construed the Indiana appraisal statute as applicable only to registered shareholders.
8. 28 Del. Ch. 433, 41 A.2d 583 (Sup. Ct. 1945) ; Annot., 158 A.L.R. 984 (1945);
see 31 VA. L. Rnv. 698 (1945).
9. See In the Matter of Gen. Realty & Util. Corp., 28 Del. Ch. 284, 42 A.2d 24
(Ch. 1945) (denying appraisal to a beneficial owner whose shares were registered in
his broker's name at the time of his objection to the proposed merger and demand
for payment) ; Schwartz v. The Olympic, Inc., 74 F. Supp. 800 (D. Del. 1947)
(construing applicable Delaware law, after Salt Dome, to deny standing to an un-
registered shareholder in an action to set aside a merger) ; Coyne v. Schenely Indus.,
Inc., 38 Del. Ch. 535, 155 A.2d 238 (Sup. Ct. 1959) (denying appraisal to an unregis-
tered beneficial shareholder of a subsidiary after a short form merger).
10. In the Matter of Rogers, 102 App. Div. 466, 92 N.Y. Supp. 465 (1905).
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Co.,11 the Delaware Chancery Court held that mere corporate awareness
that a dissenting registered shareholder is not the beneficial owner but a
mere nominee of the shares dissented is insufficient to put the corporation
on inquiry of his authority to demand appraisal and therefore an inade-
quate reason to deny his demand.
A more recent question arising under appraisal statutes concerns
whether it is permissable for an individual shareholder, who dissents from
a proposed merger and demands appraisal for a portion of his total share-
holdings, to concurrently vote for or even tacitly accept the merger as to
the balance of his stock - a practice which shall hereinafter be referred to
as appraisal splitting. Delaware's statute, like most others, qualifies for
appraisal rights only a stockholder "whose shares were not voted in
favor of" a regular merger.12 Immediately ambiguous, however, is the
term "shares." Does it refer only to those shares surrendered for ap-
praisal, in which case there would be no statutory bar to voting for and
accepting the merger as to other shares, or does it comprehend the totality
of shares held by an individual dissenter, in which case the practice of
appraisal splitting would fall within statutory prohibition?
The legislative history of appraisal statutes suggests that they were
primarily intended to benefit the shareholder who is unwilling to accept
corporate action which has the effect of compelling him to abandon his
association with the business13 - an association that would have continued
but for the consent of his peers. Therefore, as a matter of construction, a
shareholder who manifests his partial acceptance of the merger would not
seem to have been intended to fall within the statute's protection and,
indeed, might justifiably be estopped from taking the anomalous position of
dissenting from corporate action for which he is in part responsible.
Although there is little case authority on the issue, Reynolds Metals
Co. v. Colonial Realty Corp.,14 decided by the Supreme Court of Delaware,
11. 28 Del. Ch. 139, 38 A.2d 918 (Ch. 1944). This case, cited by the Olivetti court
in support of its decision, is strikingly similar to the instant case in general holding
but clearly distinguishable in underlying rationale. There, the corporation's sole
argument in support of its claim that the registered holder, suspected of being a mere
nominee, must submit proof of his authority, was that its knowledge or suspicion of
the claimant's status as a nominee imposed upon it a duty of inquiry and consequent
liability to the beneficial owner in the event that the claimant's demand for appraisal
was unauthorized. In finding that under the circumstances no such duty of inquiry
existed, the court naturally saw no other reason for requiring claimant to submit proof
of authority. As will appear more clearly hereinafter, such reasoning is insufficient
to refute the claim of the corporation in Olivetti that, even though it has no duty to
demand proof of authority from registered appraisal claimants known to be mere
nominees, it nevertheless has a right to do so, for reasons independent of protection
from possible liability to beneficial owners.
12. See D9L. COD ANN. tit. 8, § 262(b) (Supp. 1964).
13. Chicago Corp. v. Munds, 20 Del. Ch. 142, 172 Atl. 452 (Ch. 1934) (dictum).
14. 41 Del. Ch. 183, 190 A.2d 752 (Sup. Ct. 1963). Research has uncovered only
one other reported case explicitly dealing with the matter of appraisal splitting:
Bache & Co. v. General Instrument Corp., 74 N.J. Super. 92, 180 A.2d 535 (1962).
In both of these cases, a stockbroker-registered holder of shares in a corporation made
a party to a regular merger objected and demanded appraisal as to certain of such
shares after having voted the balance in favor of merger and it was established that,
in so acting, the broker represented a single identified customer, none of whose
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offers some insight into judicial reaction. In that case, the corporation
disputed the right to seek appraisal of a stockbroker-registered holder
who had voted all the shares registered in his name for merger, except
those of a customer desiring appraisal. In holding for the broker, the
court reasoned that for the protection of beneficial owners desiring to
exercise appraisal rights through their registered nominee, a broker-
registered holder of shares beneficially owned by several different customers
should, for purposes of appraisal, be regarded to be as many different
shareholders as he has customers. For example, a broker may lawfully
dissent and demand appraisal of the shares of customer A registered in
his name, notwithstanding the fact that he voted the shares of customers
B and C in favor of the merger. In so holding, however, the court was
careful to limit its condonation of appraisal splitting to the precise facts
presented. Although it declined to decide the broader question of whether
a beneficial owner of record could practice appraisal splitting in a regular
merger, the court appeared to assume that if the broker demanding
appraisal were acting for himself as beneficial owner, and not as nominee
for another, he would be ineligible under the statute since he voted some
shares in favor of merger. Because the broker appeared upon the corpo-
rate books as the absolute owner of the shares dissented, the court sug-
gested, in adumbrated but significant dicta, 15 that the corporation has a
right to inquire into the facts concerning the broker's agency in demanding
appraisal in order, presumably, to determine whether a beneficial owner
of record is engaged in appraisal splitting.
Though judicial treatment of the practice of appraisal splitting is
quite limited, an increasing number of states have recently come to recognize
and deal with the problem by statute. The appraisal statutes of both New
York and Pennsylvania appear to prohibit the practice except in the precise
situation covered by Reynolds.'6 On the other hand, those states in which
the applicable code provisions follow the terminology of the Model Busi-
beneficially owned shares was voted in favor of merger. Due to the substantial
similarity between these two cases in issues, judicial reasoning and disposition, dis-
cussion will be confined to the Reynolds opinion.
15. True, Bache & Co. is not registered as agent on the corporate books. But
this inflicts no disadvantage on the corporation. If it questions whether Bache &
Co. is acting as an agent in demanding payment for shares, it may inquire into
the facts. . . . If the corporation receives two opposing proxies from a broker,
and a demand for appraisal in respect of the shares represented by only one, and
if (as is probably unlikely) the broker fails to inform the corporation that he is
acting for a customer, the corporation can readily ascertain the fact.
41 Del. Ch. 183, 188, 190 A.2d 752, 755 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
16. N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW § 623(d) provides:
A shareholder may not dissent as to less than all the shares, as to which he
has a right to dissent, held by him of record, that he owns beneficially. A nominee
or fiduciary may not dissent on behalf of any beneficial owner as to less than all
of the shares of such owner, as to which such nominee or fiduciary has a right to
dissent, held of record by such nominee. ...
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2852-515(B) (Supp. 1965) provides:
... A dissenting shareholder may dissent as to all or less than all of those
shares registered in his name of which he is not the beneficial owner, but there
may not be dissent with respect to some but less than all shares of the same class
or series owned by any given beneficial owner of shares whether or not the shares
so owned by him are registered in his name.
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ness Corporation Act 17 appear to allow appraisal splitting by any share-
holder, whether a mere registered nominee or an actual beneficial owner.
In Olivetti, the respondent corporation, recognizing that it had no
duty to inquire into the brokers' authority in order to protect unregis-
tered beneficial owners from possible breaches of trust by their registered
nominees, nevertheless claimed a right to make such inquiry, invoking the
Reynolds dicta 8 to support this contention. Citing Northeastern Water
only in passing,19 the court denied the claimed right primarily upon the
authority of Salt Dome. It reasoned that since Salt Dome relieves the
corporation of the duty of inquiring into the authority of a broker who
is the registered holder of the shares dissented, the corporation should not
even be granted a right to do so, any dicta in Reynolds notwithstanding.
It would appear that the court was under no compulsion by reason of
Salt Dome to so hold.20 Indeed, it could have rendered a contrary decision
upon equally persuasive authority.21 Nevertheless, there are policy con-
siderations in favor of such a holding which justify the court's decision.
Specifically, it must be assumed that since a corporation is admittedly
protected under both Northeastern Water and Salt Dome if it chooses to
recognize a broker-registered holder's demand for appraisal without inquiry
into his authority, it will so choose whenever its own interests will be best
served thereby. This logically suggests that a corporation would choose
to exercise the optional right of inquiry into the broker's authority claimed
in Olivetti only when it is in the corporation's best interest to avoid pay-
ment of the judicially appraised value of the shares dissented, such as
17. ABA-ALI MODXL BUS. CORP. ACT § 73 (1953) provides: "A shareholder
may dissent as to less than all of the shares registered in his name. In that event,
his rights shall be determined as if the shares as to which he has dissented and his
other shares were registered in the names of different shareholders." State appraisal
statutes using identical or similar language include: IOWA CoDE ANN. § 496A.77(1962); NEB. Rev. STAT. § 21-2079 (Supp. 1963); S.C. CoD ANN. § 12-16.27(1)
Supp. 1965); WISC. STAT. ANN. § 180.72 (Supp. 1966). In addition, CAL. CORP.
OD § 4300 and VA. CoD ANN. § 13.1-75 (1964) would appear, by their respective
provisions, to permit appraised splitting without limitation.
18. See note 15 supra.
19. The court perhaps recognized, for various reasons, including those set out in
note 11 supra, that Northeastern Water is inapposite as precedent warranting denial
of the corporate claim of a right, independent of a duty, to inquire into the broker-
registered holder's authority to demand appraisal.
20. The rule of Salt Dome clearly finds its justification and essential purpose in
the principle of corporate protection; without such a rule, a corporation would, in
many cases, find itself faced with the unduly burdensome task of resolving misunder-
standings and clashes of opinion between non-registered and registered stockholders
over the matter of appraisal. Yet, in Olivetti, the corporation, though recognizing the
protection afforded it by Salt Dome, deliberately chose to waive such protection in the
exercise of an optional right of inquiry. To the extent Salt Dome was applied to deny
this optional right of inquiry, it would appear that the rule was extended beyond
its purpose.
21. In Zeeb v. Atlas Powder Co., 32 Del. Ch. 486, 87 A.2d 123 (Sup. Ct. 1952),
for example, the Supreme Court of Delaware, though recognizing the right of a regis-
tered stockholder to comply with the formalities of the appraisal statute through an
agent, nevertheless conceded that the corporation may inquire into such agent's
authority and assert any actual lack thereof as a defense in appraisal proceedings.
Since a registered shareholder who is a mere nominee for unregistered beneficial
owners is, in effect, nothing more than an agent when he seeks appraisal, Zeeb could
conceivably be authority for granting the right of inquiry claimed in Olivetti.
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where the judicially appraised value will probably exceed the price or
exchange opportunity offered under the merger plan. In such a situation
the corporation would undertake the inquiry in the hope of discovering a
lack of authority to seek appraisal on the broker's part which would enable
it to avoid appraisal proceedings. Yet when appraisal proceedings will
probably benefit a customer's shares, the chances that a broker lacks
authority to seek appraisal are the least. The inquiry therefore becomes a
mere fishing expedition, the cost of which to the corporation, and ulti-
mately to the corporation's other shareholders, is totally unjustified by the
prospects of its success.
In Olivetti, it was established that many petitioners had sought ap-
praisal of only a portion of the shares registered in their names, with-
holding others as to which the merger was tacitly accepted. Since petitioners
appeared of record as the absolute owners of the shares in question, they
could have been beneficial owners of record rather than, as claimed, only
registered nominees. If so, appraisal splitting would have been practiced
by beneficial owners of record rather than by registered nominee-stock-
holders as permitted in Reynolds. Presumably because of such a possi-
bility, the corporation alternatively claimed a right to inquire into the
agency of the petitioners and the identities of their beneficial owners for
the specific purpose of discovering whether any beneficial owner was
engaged in appraisal splitting. In this connection, it relied heavily upon
the Reynolds dicta 22 which appeared to sanction corporate inquiry into the
agency of a broker-registered holder practicing appraisal splitting in a
regular merger. Having rejected such Reynolds dicta earlier in its opinion,
the court made no attempt to qualify its rejection here. In specifically
denying such inquiry, the court again reserved decision on the general
question of whether a beneficial owner of record may appraisal split in a
regular merger. Instead, it reasoned that since the instant case involved a
"short form" merger, 23 in which a dissenter has neither voting rights nor
an option to remain in the surviving corporation, there is nothing in the
letter or spirit of the appraisal statute which would bar the practice. Thus
a shareholder, even a beneficial owner of record, should be allowed to
appraisal split by electing to accept the price offered under the merger
plan for some of his shares while demanding appraisal as to the balance.
In this holding, the court is unquestionably justified by the fact that
there is simply no tangible reason for prohibiting appraisal splitting by
minority shareholders of a subsidiary in the typical short form merger
situation. Certainly, the ambiguous wording of the appraisal statute24
is no bar since such terminology is logically inapplicable to the minority
subsidiary shareholder who has no voting rights which could possibly be
exercised in favor of a short form merger. 25 Moreover, it is even statu-
22. See note 15 supra.
23. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 253 (Supp. 1964). See note 1 supra.
24. DFL. CODS ANN. tit. 8, § 262(b) (Supp. 1964) qualifies for appraisal only a
shareholder "whose shares were not voted in favor of such consolidation or merger."
25. D4L. CoDe ANN. tit. 8, § 253 (Supp. 1964). See note 1 supra.
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torily inapplicable to such a shareholder.2 6 On this technical point alone
an argument could be made that even if the legislature intended section
262 (b) to prohibit appraisal splitting in regular mergers, it showed by
its refusal to make this section applicable to the rights of minority share-
holders dissenting from a "short form" merger, that any such prohibition
should not be extended to such a shareholder. Further, if there are, as
previously suggested, independent policy reasons against appraisal splitting,
they would seem confined to the regular merger situation and inapposite
to the "short form" merger situation. Even if relevant, they are probably
outweighed by the desirability of compensating minority subsidiary share-
holders for their total lack of voting rights or option to remain in the
surviving corporation after a "short form" merger, with as much flexibility
in the exercise of appraisal rights as possible.
Any criticism of the Olivetti decision must be confined to the court's
unqualified rejection of the Reynolds dicta 27 which had appeared to allow
corporate inquiry into the agency of a registered nominee-shareholder
practicing appraisal splitting in a regular merger. Such rejection, though
clearly justified upon the facts of Olivetti, is shortsighted in that it tends to
invite appraisal splitting in regular mergers beyond the scope presently
permitted by the Delaware Supreme Court. To illustrate, suppose a bene-
ficial owner of record were to vote some of his shares in favor of a regular
merger and seek appraisal of the balance. It may be that such a practice
violates the appraisal statute,28 although due to the reservation of decision in
both Reynolds and Olivetti this question is still unanswered. Yet, if the
beneficial owner were to attempt to circumvent a possible adverse ruling by
falsely claiming that the shares he dissented were beneficially owned not
by himself but by another - for whom he sought appraisal in the capacity
of a registered nominee - the corporation would be powerless to refute
his claim without the right of inquiry suggested in the Reynolds dicta.
Indeed, the corporation would be forced to recognize his demand for
appraisal made under the authority of Reynolds. It is, of course, conjec-
tural whether the court intended its rejection of the Reynolds dicta to
have this effect. It is precisely because of this doubt, however, that clarifi-
cation of the Delaware position on the practice of appraisal splitting by
beneficial owners in regular mergers is now needed, whether such clarifica-
tion be legislative, as has been the case in an increasing number of states,
29
or judicial.
William H. Danne, Jr.
26. The effect of DXL. CoDS ANN. tit. 8, §§ 253(d), (e) (Supp. 1964) is to make
only §§ 262(c)-(j) applicable to a shareholder dissenting from a short form merger.
Section 253(e) grants the general appraisal remedy to a dissenting minority share-
holder of a subsidiary made a party to a short form merger, and then refers to sections
262(c) through (j) for procedures to be followed.
27. See note 15 supra.
28. DEL. CODS ANN. tit. 8, § 262(b) (Supp. 1964).
29. See notes 16 and 17 supra.
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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - SELF-INCRIMINATION - PROSECUTION
MAY NOT USE STATEMENTS STEMMING FROM QUESTIONING INITI-
ATED BY LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER AFTER ACCUSED HAS BEEN
TAKEN INTO CUSTODY UNLESS IT DEMONSTRATES USE OF PRO-
CEDURAL SAFEGUARDS EFFECTIVE To SECURE THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST
SELF-INCRIMINATION.
Miranda v. Arizona (Vignera v. New York; Westover v.
United States; California v. Stewart) (U.S. 1966) 1
Petitioner Miranda was arrested in connection with a kidnapping and
rape; petitioners Vignera and Westover were arrested as suspects in rob-
beries; and respondent Stewart was arrested in connection with a series
of purse-snatch robberies as a result of which one of the victims had subse-
quently died. In each case the defendant was subjected to an incom-
municado interrogation without a full and effective warning of his rights
at the outset of the questioning process. In all four cases the questioning
elicited oral admissions, and in three of them, 2 signed statements all of which
were admitted in evidence at the trials. On appeal, the state high courts
affirmed the convictions of Miranda and Vignera and reversed the convic-
tion of Stewart; The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the
conviction of Westover. The United States Supreme Court granted cer-
tiorari in each case and in reversing petitioners' convictions and affirming
the California high court held, four justices dissenting, that in the absence
of other effective measures the following procedures to safeguard the
fifth amendment privilege must be observed: The person in custody must,
prior to interrogation, be clearly informed that he has the right to remain
silent, and that anything he says will be used against him in court; he
must be clearly informed that he has the right to consult with a lawyer and
to have the lawyer with him during interrogation and that, if he is indigent,
a lawyer will be appointed to represent him. 8 Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966).
1. Miranda v. Arizona, 98 Ariz. 18, 401 P.2d 721 (1965), cert. granted, 382 U.S.
925 (1965) ; Vignera v. New York, 15 N.Y.2d 970, 207 N.E.2d 527, 259 N.Y.S.2d 857(1965) (without opinion), remittitur amended, 16 N.Y.2d 614, 209 N.E.2d 110, 261
N.Y.S.2d 65 (1965), cert. granted, 382 U.S. 925 (1965) ; Westover v. United States,
342 F.2d 684 (1965), cert. granted, 382 U.S. 924 (1965); California v. Stewart, 62
Cal. 2d 571, 400 P.2d 97, 43 Cal. Rptr. 201 (1965), cert. granted, 382 U.S. 937 (1965).
This is a composite decision, all four cases being cited as Miranda v. Arizona.
2. Miranda, Westover and Stewart.
3. The Court stated that:
We hold that when an individual is taken into custody or otherwise deprived ofhis freedom by the authorities and is subjected to questioning, the privilege against
self-incrimination is jeopardized. Procedural safeguards must be employed to pro-
tect the privilege, and unless other fully effective means are adopted to notify
the person of his right of silence and to assure that the exercise of the right will
be scrupulously honored, the following measures are required. He must be warned
prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he
says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the pres-
ence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed
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Prior to the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Massiah
v. United States,4 the admissibility of confessions stemming from cus-
todial interrogation was determined on the basis of the "totality of cir-
cumstances" test as applied under the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment.5 The sixth amendment guarantees of the right to
counsel had been held binding on the states through the fourteenth amend-
ment in Gideon v. WainwrightA and the "critical stage" concept of when
this right accrues had been expanded in Hamilton v. Alabama7 and White
v. Maryland.8 However, the question of the accused's right to counsel
during police interrogation remained unsettled.
In Massiah, the Court, basing its decision specifically on the sixth
amendment, held inadmissible incriminating statements obtained from a
defendant after indictment and in the absence of retained counsel. The
Court pointed out that its decision was a logical extension of the develop-
ing pre-trial right to counsel announced previously in the Hamilton and
White decisions. One month after Massiah the fifth amendment was held
binding on the states in Malloy v. Hogan.10 The fact that the Court had
relied heavily on the confession cases in reaching this decision gave rise to
speculation concerning the relation of the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion to police interrogation, but its full implications were unclear."
The following week the Court handed down its decision in Escobedo
v. Illinois.'2 This case, argued prior to Malloy, involved incriminating
for him prior to any questioning if he so desires. Opportunity to exercise these
rights must be afforded to him throughout the interrogation. After such warnings
have been given, and such opportunity afforded him, the individual may know-
ingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer questions or make
a statement. But unless and until such warnings and waiver are demonstrated by
the prosecution at trial, no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be
used against him.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478-79 (1966).
4. 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
5. See, e.g., Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 513 (1963) ; Culombe v. Con-
necticut, 367 U.S. 568, 601-02 (1961) ; Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433, 442 (1961) ; Payne
v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 567 (1958); Cohn, Federal Constitutional Limitations on
the Use of Coerced Confessions in the State Courts, 50 J. CRIM. L., C. & P.S. 265
(1959) ; Herman, The Supreme Court and Restrictions On Police Interrogation, 25
OHIO ST. L.J. 449, 453 (hereinafter cited as Herman) ; Developments in the Law -
Confessions, 79 HARV. L. Riv. 935, 961-83 (1966) (hereinafter cited as Developments).
6. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
7. 368 U.S. 335 (1963). In this case, which was decided prior to Gideon, the
Court found that under Alabama law arraignment was a "critical stage in a criminal
proceeding" because a defendant must then assert certain defenses or lose the right
to assert them at trial.
8. 373 U.S. 59 (1963) (per curiam). Defendant, not represented by counsel,
pleaded guilty at a preliminary hearing although no plea was required under Maryland
law. Although he changed his plea to not guilty, his confession was used against him
at trial. The Court found the hearing a "critical stage," therefore requiring appointed
counsel under the fourteenth amendment.
9. See generally Enker & Elsen, Counsel for the Suspect: Massiah v. United
States and Escobedo v. Illinois, 49 MINN. L. Rtv. 47, 49-51 (hereinafter cited as Enker
and Elsen) ; Developments, supra note 5, at 998.
10. 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964).
11. See Herman, supra note 5, at 462-81; Developments, supra note 5, at 982-83.
12. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
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statements elicited by police interrogations that had been conducted prior
to indictment, without a warning to the accused of his right to remain
silent, and after a denial of Escobedo's request to consult with his attorney
who was present at the time in the police station. Mr. Justice Goldberg,
speaking for a five to four majority, relied on the sixth amendment to
reverse Escobedo's conviction by finding that police interrogation is a
"critical stage," as was the arraignment in Hamilton and the hearing in
White. But in contrast with the broad language of the opinion, the actual
holding was limited to the particular facts of the case, thereby engendering
conflicting views as to its implications. 13
Against this confusing background, the Supreme Court in Miranda
announced that by applying long recognized principles it would lay down
concrete constitutional guidelines for law inforcement agencies to follow. 1 4
The issue before the Court was whether the privilege against self-incrimi-
nation is fully applicable during a period of custodial interrogation.
The Court reviewed the modern methods of interrogation 15 and
found them so inherently compulsive that without adequate protective
devices no statement from a defendant could be considered the product
of free choice. 6 A study of the historical development of the privilege led
the Court to conclude that it is fulfilled only when an individual is guar-
anteed the right "to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfet-
tered exercise of his own will.'u 7 The Court found judicial precedent for
applying this privilege to incommunicado interrogation by adopting the
following language from Brain v. United States :is
In criminal trials, in the courts of the United States, wherever a
question arises whether a confession is incompetent because not volun-
tary, the issue is controlled by that portion of the 5th Amendment...
commanding that no person "shall be compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself."
Examining the scope of the privilege against self-incrimination the
Court declared that in federal interrogations, the McNabb-Mallory'9 super-
visory rules are based on the same fifth amendment principles that were
before the Court in the instant case. 20 As to the states, the Court declared
13. See Enker & Elsen, supra note 9; Comment, 31 U. CI. L. Riv. 313 (1964)
Developments, supra note 5, at 1000-06. However, the Court in Johnson v. New
Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 734 (1966), reiterated the precise holding of Escobedo, indicating
that it is to be limited to its facts in application.
14. 384 U.S. 436, 441-42 (1966).
15. Id. at 445-58 (quoting authorities used).
16. Id. at 448.
17. Id. at 460 [quoting Mallory v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964)].
18. 168 U.S. 532, 542 (1897) [quoted at 384 U.S. 436, 461 (1966)].
19. Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957); McNabb v. United States,
318 U.S. 332 (1943) ; see generally Hogan & Snee, The McNabb-Mallory Rule: Its
Rise, Rationale and Rescue, 47 Go. L.J. 1 (1958).
20. 384 U.S. at 463 n.32, where the Court declared that the instant case does not
indicate in any manner that the supervisory rules can be disregarded.
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that the Malloy opinion had made it clear that the "voluntariness doc-
trine" reflects all the policies embedded in the privilege against self-
incrimination 2 1 and that the failure of the police to advise the defendant of
his right to remain silent was an essential ingredient in Escobedo.22 The
Court explained that since it was the compelling atmosphere of the in-
custody interrogation that had caused the defendant to speak,2 3 the pres-
ence of counsel was selected as a device to protect the defendant's rights
there and at the trial.24
Certain aspects of this rule as explained by the Court require further
consideration. The warnings as to the accused's right to silence, that any
statements that he may make will be used against him and of his right to
have counsel at the interrogation are considered by the Court to be indis-
pensable. The Court stressed that it will not even inquire in individual
cases as to whether the defendant was aware of his rights if such a warning
was not given.
25
Failure to request an attorney does not constitute a waiver20 and no
effective waiver of the right will be recognized unless it was specifically
made after such warnings have been given.27 If there were no attorney
present at the interrogation, a heavy burden rests on the prosecution to
demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his
rights.2 8 Although an express declaration that the individual is willing to
make a statement and does not want the assistance of counsel, followed
closely by such a statement, could constitute a waiver, a waiver will not be
21. 378 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1964).
22. 378 U.S. 478, 483, 485, 491 (1964) (referred to by the instant Court at 384
U.S. at 465).
23. Cf. Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 514 (1963).
24. The presence of counsel when statements are taken during interrogation
enhances the integrity of the fact finding processes in court. See 384 U.S. at 466 n.36,
citing authorities including Note, 73 YAL LJ. 1000, 1048-51 (1964); Comment, 31
U. CHI. L. Rgv. 313, 320 (1964).
It has been suggested that another fully effective means for protecting the defen-
dant's rights would be the McNabb-Mallory approach, whereby the suspect would be
taken to a magistrate immediately following arrest in order to be apprised of his rights.
See Nedrud, The Ntw Fifth Amendment Concept: SELF'-INCRIMINATION REDEFIND,
2 J. NATIONAL DISTRIc'r ATTORNEYS A. 113 (1966) (hereinafter cited as Nedrud).
25. 384 U.S. at 468-69; cf. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), and the recurrent
inquiry into special circumstances it necessitated.
26. See, Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 513 (1962) ; Herman, supra note 5,
at 474-81 and authorities there cited. See generally Comment, 31 U. CII. L. Rgv.
591 (1964).
27. 384 U.S. at 470; but see id. at 474 n.44, where the Court indicates that if an
individual has his attorney present, further questioning may be permissible even though
the suspect indicates a desire to remain silent.
28. Id. at 475. The placing of the onus on the prosecution might very well be
the backbone of the decision in that it is necessary to prevent the issue from resolving
itself into a shouting match. This was frequently the situation in prior confession cases
due to the courts lack of knowledge of what happened at the police station. See
Herman, supra note 5, at 497.
In Miranda, the Court declared that the "mere fact that the defendant signed a
statement which contained a typed-in clause stating that he had 'full knowledge' of
his 'legal rights' does not approach the knowing and intelligent waiver required to
relinquish constitutional rights." 384 U.S. at 492.
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presumed merely from the silence of the accused; and no matter what
testimony is offered by the prosecuting authorities as to the waiver of
rights by an accused, the fact of lengthy interrogation or incommunicado
incarceration before such a statement is made is strong evidence that no
valid waiver was made.29 It should be noted that the rules established in
the instant case apply to any statement made by a defendant and that the
Court makes no distinction between "confessions" and "admissions" or
between inculpatory and exculpatory statements.80
Mr. Justice White, in his dissent joined in by Justices Harlan and
Stewart, asserted that the decision leaves open the questions of whether
the accused was in custody, whether his statements were spontaneous or
the product of interrogation, and whether nontestimonial evidence intro-
duced at trial is the fruit of statements made during a prohibited inter-
rogation.81 The majority in the instant case declared that these principles
apply when an individual is first subjected to interrogation - whether in
custody at the police station or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action
in any way.8 2 At the very least, the rules set forth by the Court apply at
the arrest stage, and this would appear to include any form of "stop-and-
frisk" detention.88 The majority stressed that it is a compelling atmos-
phere that invokes the Miranda standards. The deprivation of freedom,
and not the suspicion of crime, is the critical factor in determining whether
one was under compulsion.
As to the spontaneity of the statements, the Court emphasised that
the fundamental import of the privilege does not involve merely talking to
the police without warnings and the advice of counsel, "but whether [the
defendant] can be interrogated" in ignorance of his rights.8 4 The rules do
not apply to one who enters a police station on his own and wants to
confess or to one who calls the police in order to make a statement.85
Although the question of whether non-testimonial evidence introduced
at trial is the actual "fruit" of an inadmissible statement may be an open
question in an individual case, the use of such "fruits" appears to have been
foreclosed by the Court when it stated that, "unless and until such warnings
29. 384 U.S. at 476; In Stewart, the defendant had been held for five days and
questioned nine times before confessing. The Court held that these circumstances were
'subject to no other construction than that he was compelled by persistent interroga-
tion to forgo his Fifth Amendment privilege." Id. at 499.
30. Id. at 476-77. This appears to preclude the use of statements for impeaching
the testimony of a defendant, therefore indicating that the fifth amendment exclusionary
rule is broader than that of the fourth amendment; see Walder v. United States, 347
U.S. 62 (1954) ; Developments, supra note 5, at 1029-30.
31. 384 U.S. at 545.
32. Id. at 444, 477, 478.
33. See Nedrud, supra note 24, at 114. See generally Remington, The Law
Relating to "On the Street" Detention, Questioning and Frisking of Suspected Persons
and Police Arrest Privileges in General, in POLICE POW4R AND INDIVIDUAL FRSlDOM
11 (Sowle ed. 1962).
34. 384 U.S. at 478.
35. Ibid.
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and waiver are demonstrated by the prosecution at trial, no evidence
obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against him."36
The instant decision was handed down in the midst of a widespread
and heated controversy over the necessity and propriety of police interroga-
tion and the use of confessions obtained thereby.37 Lack of factual data
has precluded an authoritative evaluation of the claims of the argument in
the past; and for the same reason, the question of the overall impact of
Miranda on law enforcement must remain open until adequate study has
been made.88 However, the results of a study recently completed by Evelle
J. Younger, District Attorney of Los Angeles County,3 9 indicated that
confessions were found necessary to successful prosecution in fewer than
10 per cent of the 4,000 felony cases considered. This evidence contradicts
the frequent claims by police and prosecutors that a large percentage of
the convictions in major cases are based on statements or confessions
obtained during interrogation. Furthermore, this study reported that 50
per cent of the suspects confessed in spite of warnings by the police of their
right to remain silent and to have an attorney.40
However, even if confessions do play such a minor role in overall law
enforcement, the kind of cases in which interrogation is most critical is a
necessary consideration. If the need is greatest in crimes of violence -
assault, rape, robbery, and homicide 4' - then an inability to obtain convic-
tions as a result of strict interrogation procedures could pose a serious
threat to society. It is the effect that the instant decision will have on the
protection of society against this type of crime that will determine the price
paid for the stronger constitutional protections that have been afforded
the individual.
Albert A. Lindner
36. 384 U.S. at 479 (Emphasis added.) ; but see Enker & Elsen, supra note 9, at 79,
for an argument that the "fruits" doctrine should not apply to confessions. See gener-
ally Developments, supra note 5, at 1024-28.
37. See Developments, supra note 5, at 938-51 for a review of the arguments
and authorities.
38. The potential impact of Miranda was somewhat lessened one week later when
the Court held in Johnson v. New Jersey that Escobedo and Miranda are applicable
only to those cases in which trial began after the decisions were announced. However,
the Court declared that "the nonretroactivity of those cases does not preclude persons
whose trials have already been completed from invoking the newly established safe-
guards as part of an involuntariness claim." 384 U.S. at 750. See Davis v. North
Carolina, 384 U.S. 737 (1966), decided the same day as Johnson.
39. Zion, So They Don't Talk, N.Y. Times, Aug. 21, 1966, § 4, p. 13, col. 1; cf.
Sobel, The Exclusionary Rules in the Law of Confessions: A Legal Perspective - A
Practical Perspective, 154 N.Y.L.J. 1, 4 (Nov. 22, 1965). Judge Nathan Sobel came
to substantially the same conclusions on the basis of a survey conducted in Kings
County, New York; but see, Developments, supra at 942-45.
40. Zion, So They Don't Talk, N.Y. Times, Aug. 21, 1966, § 4, p. 13, col. 1.
41. A Forum on the Interrogation of the Accused, 49 CORNELL L.Q. 382, 387-89(1964) (remarks of Professor Inbau).
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TORTS - STRICT LIABILITY FOR DEFECTIVE PRODUCTS - PENNSYL-
VANIA ADOPTS SECTION 402A OF RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS.
Webb v. Zern (Pa. 1966)
Plaintiff sustained severe injuries when a keg of beer, purchased
by his father and tapped by his brother, exploded while plaintiff was in
the room in which the keg had been placed. Plaintiff alleged negligence,
relying on the doctrine of exclusive control,' and joined as defendants the
manufacturer of the keg, the brewer who had filled the keg, and the
distributor who had sold the keg to plaintiff's father.
The trial court dismissed the complaint, ruling that the failure of the
plaintiff to join his father and brother as defendants prevented invocation
of the exclusive control doctrine thus rendering futile plaintiff's attempt
to prove negligence. On appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed,
holding that Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts2 providing
for strict liability in tort for sellers of defective products is now the law of
Pennsylvania. The plaintiff was permitted to amend his complaint to
benefit from the newly adopted basis of liability. Webb v. Zern, 422 Pa.
424, 220 A.2d 853 (1966).
The evolution of the modern law of products liability has been marked
by the inexorable disintegration of the classical prerequisites to recovery
for damages arising out of personal injury or property loss due to a
defective product: privity of contract and proof of negligence. The prem-
ise that a manufacturer of a defective product could not be liable, even
for negligence, to a party with whom he was not in contractual privity
came from the misunderstanding and misinterpretation of Lord Abinger's
dicta in Winterbottom v. Wright.8 This bar to recovery persisted for
three-quarters of a century, with certain exceptions, 4 until 1916 when Judge
Cardozo, speaking for the New York Court of Appeals, permitted re-
1. This is a doctrine very similar to that of res ipsa loquitur and more or less
peculiar to Pennsylvania law in accident cases. See Loch v. Confair, 372 Pa. 212, 93
A.2d 451 (1953).
2. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS § 402A (1965) provides:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably danger-
ous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for
physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his
property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer Without sub-
stantial change in the condition in which it is sold.(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale
of his product, and(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into
any contractual relation with the seller.
3. "Unless we confine the operation of . . . contracts . . . to the parties who
entered into them, the most absurd and outrageous consequences ...would ensue."
Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M.&W. 109, 114, 152 Eng. Rep. 402, 405 (1842). See
Huset v. J. I. Case Threshing Mach. Co., 120 Fed. 865 (8th Cir. 1903) ; PROSSER, TORTS
§ 96, at 658 (3d ed. 1964).
4. See 1 FRUMSR AND FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY 5.02 (1966).
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covery against the manufacturer of a defective automobile, upon proof of
negligence, by one not in privity of contract. 5
Generally concurrent with this inception and development of the
negligence action was a striking development in the common law and
statutory action for breach of warranty. The privity requirements pre-
viously deemed essential by common law conceptualists were being
abandoned by some courts when impure foodstuffs and medicines caused
injury to a human being.6 In later years, this derogation of privity was
continued when products intended for intimate bodily use caused personal
injury due to some latent defect.7  Henningson v. Bloomfield Motors,
Inc.8 went even further toward abandoning privity requirements in per-
mitting the wife of a new car purchaser, injured after a mechanical defect
caused the car to leave the road while she was driving, to recover from
both the dealer and the manufacturer of the car. The liability of both
defendants was expressed in strict warranty liability9 despite the absence
of privity of contract with the plaintiff wife. Henningson has since become
the landmark decision for those courts which have used the warranty
action to afford relief to an injured party not in privity with the manu-
facturer or seller of a defective product.
Many courts which have considered the problem, however, have not
been willing to extend the strict warranty liability to parties when no
privity of contract exists.' 0 In these jurisdictions, the "citadel of privity"' "
has remained a formidable bar to recovery in spite of increased demand
for more adequate consumer protection.
In a concurring opinion to Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co.,12 Justice
(now Chief Justice) Traynor of the California Supreme Court first promul-
gated the underlying rationale for granting increased protection when he
stated:
Those who suffer injury from defective products are unprepared to
meet its consequences. The cost of an injury and the loss of time or
health may be an overwhelming misfortune to the person injured,
and a needless one, for the risk of injury can be insured by the
manufacturer and distributed among the public as a cost of doing
business. It is to the public interest to discourage the marketing of
products having defects that are a menace to the public. If such
products nevertheless find their way into the market, it is to the
public interest to place the responsibility for whatever injury they may
cause upon the manufacturer, who, even if he is not negligent in the
5. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
6. See Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel, 69 YALS L.J. 1099, 1103 (1960).
7. Id. at 1110.
8. 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
9. A form of action ex contractu rather than ex delicto.
10. See 2 FRUMER AND FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTs LIABILITY § 16.03(5) (1966).
11. The phrase, much quoted, came from Judge Cardozo in Uutramares Corp. v.
Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 180, 174 N.E. 441, 445 (1931) when he said: "The assault
upon the citadel of privity is proceeding in these days apace." See generally Prosser,
The Assault Upon the Citadel, 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960) ; Prosser, The Fall Of The
Citadel, 50 MINN. L. REv. 791 (1966).
12. 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944).
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manufacture of the product, is responsible for its reaching the market.
However intermittently such injuries may occur and however hap-
hazardly they may strike, the risk of their occurrence is a constant
risk and a general one. Against such a risk there should be general
and constant protection and the manufacturer is best situated to
afford such protection.13
But more importantly, Justice Traynor's opinion is thought by many
to have alluded to a new approach to this old problem: a strict liability in
tort for manufacturers of defective products. 1 4 The decisional breakthrough
for this concept of liability in the products area did not come until almost
twenty years later when in 1963, Justice Traynor, in Greenman v. Yuba
Power Prods., Inc.,'0 stated for a unanimous California Supreme Court
that the manufacturer of a defective product is strictly liable in tort. Since
Greenman, at least thirteen jurisdictions'0 have approved or adopted strict
liability in tort as a basis for recovery. With the development of this
apparent trend, privity of contract and proof of negligence in products
cases seem to be on the wane as meaningful concepts.
Section 402A of the Restatement appears to take a compromise
position between those progressive jurisdictions which give credence to
Justice Traynor's early insights and those jurisdictions still inhibited by
conceptual abstractions and procedural niceties. Of those progressive
courts, many have reached results, either in strict tort liability or by
liberal construction of their warranty provisions, which far exceed the
compromise provisions of the Restatement.' 7 Indeed, if section 402A is not
given liberal construction, its provisions may already be antiquated. In this
respect, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has an opportunity to play a
pioneer role.
A plaintiff who brings an action in Pennsylvania under section 402A
avoids most of the horizontal' s and vertical19 strictures heretofore imposed
by privity of contract. Horizontally, the plaintiff need only be a user or
consumer 20 of the defective product. The Restatement expresses no opinion
as to whether recovery should be extended to parties not meeting this dis-
13. Id. at 462, 150 P.2d at 441. See also PROSSER, TORTS § 97 (3d ed. 1964).
14. The following excerpt from Justice Traynor's concurring opinion in Escola
is said to support this view:
It should now be recognized that a manufacturer incurs an absolute liability when
an article that he has placed on the market, knowing that it is to be used without
inspection, proves to have a defect that causes injury to human beings.
Id. at 461, 150 P.2d at 440.
15. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
16. California, Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, New Jersey, New York,
Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee and Texas.
17. See generally 2 FRUM9R AND FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY §§ 16.04-16A
(1966).
18. Horizontal privity pertains to those parties other than the purchaser who might
have a cause of action against the seller.
19. Vertical privity pertains to those parties in the distributive chain besides the
immediate seller who may be sued when a defective product causes injury or
property damage.
20. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), TORTS § 402A, comment 1, at 354 (1965).
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junctive test.21 However, in a comment to the relevant caveat, the Ameri-
can Law Institute recognizes that there may be no essential reason why such
parties should not be brought within the scope of the protection afforded.22
Vertically, a cause of action may be brought against any party in the
distributive chain who sells a defective product. This would include re-
tailers, wholesalers, distributors, and manufacturers as well as any other
party in the business of selling a product.23 The requirement of a sale of a
product would preclude recovery under the Restatement where the trans-
action was, for example, a bailment, a pre-purchase trial arrangement or
the sale of passage by a carrier, although two recent cases offer very
persuasive reasoning favoring the inclusion of the first two situations in the
protection afforded by strict liability in tort.2 4
The protection given the user or consumer under section 402A allows
recovery for physical harm done to him or his property as a result of the
defective product. This language does not encompass a result similar to
the holding in Santor v. A. & M. Karagheusian, Inc. 25 that a purchaser
may recover damages for economic loss 26 against the manufacturer of a
defective product under the theory of strict tort liability.
As to other issues relating to defective products and certain to arise
in future litigation, the ALI has expressed no opinion, for the most part
relying on the lack of sufficient authority to support any conclusive posi-
21. Id. caveat 1, at 348.
22. Id. comment o at 356. See also Note, Strict Products Liability And The
Bystander, 64 COLUm. L. REv. 916 (1964).
23. Id. comment f at 350. See also 2 FRUMIER AND FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY
§ 16A(4) (b) (i) (1966).
24. Delaney v. Towmotor Corp., 339 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1964) (involving a pre-
purchase trial arrangement); Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Serv., 45
N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769 (1965) (involving a bailment). See Goldberg v. Kollsman
Instrument Co., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1963) (a warranty
action in which it was recognized that strict tort liability was "surely a more accurate
phrase"). The question of an airplane manufacturer's strict liability when the plane
proved defective and crashed was involved in Goldberg. However, the possibility of
strict liability for the airline carrier was not discussed. The requirement of sale pro-
vision in section 402A is illustrative of the compromise position taken by the Institute,
whereby a traditional prerequisite of warranty recovery was incorporated into the
Restatement provision. To this extent, the Restatement position may be dated, as
progressive jurisdictions unimpeded by common-law concepts and working outside of
the Restatement have and, undoubtedly, will continue to afford strict liability relief
when social policy requires.
25. 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965).
26. Economic loss would include diminution in the value of the product because
it is inferior in quality and does not work for the general purposes for which it was
manufactured as well as lost profits incurred as a result of the product defect. See
Comment, Manufacturer's Liability to Remote Purchasers for "Economic Loss"
Damages - Tort or Contract?, 114 U. PA. L. Riv. 539 (1966); Note, The Scope
of the Manufacturer's Strict Liability in Tort for Defective Goods, 27 U. PITT. L.
Rtv. 683 (1966). In Seely v. White Motor Co. 63 Cal. 2d 1, 403 P.2d 145, 45
Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965), the California Supreme Court expressly refused to permit
recovery for economic loss damages under the theory of strict tort liability. Cf. Ford
Motor Co. v. Lonon, 398 S.W.2d 240 (Tenn. 1966) where economic loss damages
were recoverable under the misrepresentation principle as developed in RtSTAT SENT
(SUcOND), ToRTs § 402B (1965) and in a parallel rule relating to pecuniary loss
(tent. draft of proposed § 552D - Council Draft No. 17, p. 76).
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tion. Typical of these issues are the liability of the manufacturer of
a defective component part 27 and the liability of a manufacturer of a
defective product which is expected to be processed or otherwise sub-
stantially changed before it reaches the user or consumer. 28  Concerning
the former, the ALI did suggest that where there is no change in the
component part itself, it merely being incorporated into something larger,
the strict liability advantage will be found to devolve to the ultimate user
or consumer. 29  The policy considerations30 supporting an action against
the manufacturer of the defective finished product are equally applicable
to a manufacturer of a defective component part, and there is case authority
supporting this extension of liability. 31 As to products expected to be
processed, the ALI suggests32 that the mere fact that a product is to
undergo further processing or substantial change should not of itself pre-
clude liability against the manufacturer of that product. The question
seems essentially one of shifting responsibility to the intermediate party
where the factual situation justifies the shift.
One issue not expressly covered in the text or comments of section
402A but deserving of mention is whether the seller of a defective used
product is to be covered by the Restatement. The suggestion has been
made that the language of section 402A appears to include the seller of a
defective used product 33 and the New Jersey Supreme Court,34 in dicta,
expressly stated that no distinction would be made between new or used
chattels in holding the seller strictly liable in tort or warranty.
By adopting section 402A, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has sub-
stantially followed the same course as the Tennessee Supreme Court35
which also approved strict liability in tort in the face of numerous prece-
dents demanding the establishment of privity in warranty, without ex-
pressly overruling any prior decisions dealing with warranty. Strict liability
in tort under section 402A has not been made the exclusive theory for
recovery available to a Pennsylvania plaintiff seeking redress for personal
injury or property damage resulting from a defective product. An action
27. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), TORTS § 402A, caveat 3, at 348 (1965).
28. Id. caveat 2, at 348.
29. Id. comment q at 358.
30. See text accompanying note 13 supra.
31. Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965) (manu-
facturer of a defective brake system strictly liable in tort). Putman v. Erie City Mfg.
Co., 338 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1964) and Deveny v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 319 F.2d 124 (2d
Cir. 1963) held the component parts manufacturer strictly liable in warranty but the
policy considerations would apply as well for strict liability in tort. But see Goldberg
v. Kollsman Instrument Co., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1963)
where the court refused to extend strict liability to the manufacturer of a defective
altimeter which caused a plane to crash, reasoning that adequate protection was
provided for the passengers by holding liable the solvent airplane manufacturer which
put into the market the completed aircraft.
32. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS § 402A, comment p at 357 (1965).
33. 2 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, PRODUcTs LIABILITY § 16A(4) (b) (iv) (1966).
34. Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Serv., 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d
769 (1965).
35. See Ford Motor Co. v. Lonon, 398 S.W.2d 240 (Tenn. 1966).
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based on negligence is not precluded3 6 and a warranty action is available
under the appropriate sections of the Uniform Commercial Code.3 7
The restrictive construction given section 2-31838 of the Code by the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court probably contributed to the position taken by
the court in the instant decision. In Hochgertel v. Canada Dry Corp.,39
recovery was denied to a bartender who was injured when an unopened
bottle of soda water exploded, on the ground that the non-purchasing
bartender was not a member of the buyer's family, his household or a
guest in his home.40 In a case41 decided the same day as the instant deci-
sion, it was held that a nephew of a buyer, living next door to the buyer,
was "in the family" and that the nephew's administrator was entitled to
recovery from the immediate vendor to the aunt, after a defective vaporizer
splashed boiling water on the child causing his death. In so holding, the
court disallowed recovery from parties above the immediate seller in the
distributive chain, thus failing to act affirmatively on the possibility of
enlarged liability suggested by the neutrality comment to section 2-318.42
This apparent determination of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to
treat the provisions of section 2-318 as exclusive will give added signifi-
cance to the strict tort action when an individual or corporate user or con-
sumer not in privity of contract and incurring only physical property
damage as a result of a product defect, brings suit in a Pennsylvania forum.
There is no present reason to believe that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
will extend protection in warranty under this section beyond "natural
persons" or for property damage not accompanied by personal injury.4 3
However, section 402A clearly includes corporate users and consumers
within the ambit of recovery and, in addition, extends protection where
physical property damage is the only result of the defective product.
36. See RESTATEMENT (StcoND), TORTS § 402A, comment a at 348 (1965).
37. Express warranties - PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 2-313 (Supp. 1965)
Implied warranties - PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, §§ 2-314, -315 (Supp. 1965).
38. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 2-318 (Supp. 1965) provides:
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural person
who is in the family or household of his buyer or who is a guest in his home if it
is reasonable to expect that such person may use, consume or be affected by the
goods and who is injured in person by breach of the warranty. A seller may not
exclude or limit the operation of this section.
39. 409 Pa. 610, 187 A.2d 575 (1963).
40. Although the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, on facts similar to those in
Hochgertel, might reach the same holding under § 402A by refusing to extend
recovery beyond users and consumers (see note 21 supra), it is indisputable that in
Pennsylvania the Restatement provision is much broader in scope than § 2-318 of
the Code in light of its narrow construction by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
41. Miller v. Preitz, 422 Pa. 383, 221 A.2d 320 (1966).
42. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODF § 2-318, comment 3 which reads:
This section expressly includes as beneficiaries within its provisions the family,
household, and guests of the purchaser. Beyond this, the section is neutral and is
not intended to enlarge or restrict the developing case law on whether the seller's
warranties, given to his buyer who resells, extend to other persons in the dis-
tributive chain.
43. See Atlas Aluminum Corp. v. Borden Chem. Corp., 233 F. Supp. 53, 54-55
(E.D. Pa. 1964), in which the court held "that under Pennsylvania substantive law the
privity defense has not been vanquished where the claim is based on an implied war-
ranty and the damages sustained are solely property damages or commercial losses
without personal injury."
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Until there is case law construing the scope of coverage permitted by
section 402A, the Code - as section 2-318 has been construed in Penn-
sylvania - may offer a ground for recovery in one area where the Re-
statement might not. Thus, if it is reasonable to expect that a person in
the family, a member of the household, or a guest of the buyer would be
"affected" by the defective goods, the Code would permit recovery al-
though the Restatement requirement of "user or consumer" has not been
fulfilled.
Procedurally, a Code action in Pennsylvania under sections 2-318 and
2-714 offers the significant advantage to an injured plaintiff of a longer
statute of limitations. 44 In other respects, an action under the Restatement
would seem more advantageous. It has been held recently that a wrongful
death action is not permitted for breach of warranty under the Code.45
Also, Code requirements of notice to the seller,46 and the possibility of dis-
claimer 47 could undermine recovery by an injured plaintiff.48
Although the decision in the instant case has moved the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court into the forefront of modern progressive courts, section
402A, unconstrued, is not a panacea for all Pennsylvania plaintiffs injured
by defective products. The parallel actions of negligence and warranty
under the Code will initially be significant in problem areas not clearly
encompassed by the Restatement or where a rule of procedure bars its use.
Of course, where there can be optional theories of recovery, the Restate-
ment cause of action is most desirable. Later vitality of negligence and
warranty actions will depend on the construction given to section 402A.
A continued progressive approach to the problems in this area will un-
doubtedly show that the decision in the principal case has initiated the
demise of privity of contract and proof of negligence in Pennsylvania
products liability cases.
Robert B. White, Jr.
44. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 2-725 (Supp. 1965) provides for a four year
statute of limitations. See Gardiner v. Philadelphia Gas Works, 413 Pa. 415, 197
A.2d 612 (1964) which holds that the Code statute of limitations applies in a warranty
action when personal injuries are claimed. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 34 (1953)
provides for a two year statute of limitations in a personal injury action not resulting
in death and PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, . 1603 (1953) provides for a one year statute
of limitations for a wrongful death action.
45. Miller v. Preitz, 422 Pa. 383, 221 A.2d 320 (1966).
46. UNIFORM COMM9RCIAL CODS, § 2-607(3) (a). See comment 5 id. But see
Santor v. A.&M. Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965) (action by
buyer against manufacturer of defective rug), Piercefield v. Remington Arms Co.,
375 Mich. 85, 133 N.W.2d 129 (1965) (action by bystander against manufacturer of
defective shotgun shell) and Wights v. Staff Jennings, Inc., 405 P.2d 624 (Ore. 1965)
(action by buyer's wife against seller of defective boat), all arising under the Uniform
Sales Act and holding that notice as required by section 49 was not required by these
plaintiffs who were not in privity with the defendants. Section 49 of the Uniform
Sales Act is covered by sections 2-607(2) and (3) of the Code.
47. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, § 2-316. But see §§ 2-302 and 2-719(3). Hen-
ningson v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960) held that a
manufacturer's attempted disclaimer was "inimical to the public good" and void. Id. at
405, 161 A.2d at 95.
48. See generally Rapson, Products Liability Under Parallel Doctrines: Con-
tracts Between The Uniform Commercial Code and Strict Liability In Tort, 19
RUTGtRS L. lrv. 692 (1965).
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